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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Second Seminole War, fought from 1835-1842, was undoubtedly the 
longest, costliest conflict the United States engaged in between the American Revolution 
and the Civil War. From 1836 to 1839 the federal budget quadrupled appropriations of 
the conflict. As the war escalated in scale, many of these funds went to paying civilian 
claims and the supplying of Volunteer regiments with horses and gear for their short 
campaign contracts. This study will argue that the formation, development, and eventual 
exploitation of the logistical supply lines have been a critically overlooked aspect of the 
Second Seminole War. Using seldom-analyzed records of the Quartermaster 
Department, new trends emerge in the typical narratives of the war, particularly 
surrounding the federal government's purchase, sale, use, and abuse of horses both in 
and outside of the theater of war.  The misapplication of horses negatively affected the 
operational, logistical, and financial integrity of American forces during the first 
campaigns of the Second Seminole War. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On the cold, damp, morning of December 28, 1835, one hundred and eight men 
in sky-blue overcoats continued their fourth day of marching from Tampa to the isolated 
interior post of Fort King in the territory of Florida.  The infantry men marched in two 
files along a well-worn military road.  A small contingent of officers on horseback acted 
as the advanced guard; to the column’s rear, a team of horses pulled a wagon, another 
pulled a cannon.  Amidst the tall grass and palmettoes the only creatures able to see the 
hundreds of armed figures clinging close to trees and brush would have been the horses.  
If they noticed they made no sign.  Lt. Francis Dade, leading the column, turned in his 
saddle and called back to the troops that if they reached Fort King that day they would 
receive three days of rest for Christmas.1  After traveling a few hundred meters further, 
the forest belched fire and smoke and struck the man down. The attack came swiftly 
from all angles, killing dozens in the first volley.  What followed was a day long siege as 
the survivors used a hastily constructed fortification and the cannon to fend off a vastly 
superior Seminole force.  Only three survived, limping back, wounded, to Fort Brooke at 
Tampa. Their narrative of the events sparked calls for war throughout the nation. Two 
months later, General Edmund P. Ganies’s column found the remains of the battlefield.  
1 John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1985), 105; Frank Laumer, Dade’s Last Command (Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida, 1995), 180. 
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A hundred skeletons, many lying where they fell, slumped over the barricade and 
cannon, and several a hundred meters away next to their horses, in officers’ regalia.2  
The destruction of Dade’s detachment and an assassination of an Indian Agent at Fort 
King two days before the detachment was scheduled to arrive, acted as the primary 
impetus for increased American military operations in Florida.  
 The Second Seminole War, fought from 1835-1842 was undoubtedly the longest, 
costliest conflict the United States engaged in between the American Revolution and the 
Civil War.  The destruction of Dade’s detachment and assassination of Agent Wiley 
Thompson were merely further instances of violence between Seminoles and whites in 
the Northern Florida Peninsula.3  Florida militia units and small contingents of federal 
forces campaigned frequently against Seminoles and Anti-American Creeks in Northern 
Peninsular Florida in 1834 and 1835.4  Following the slaughter of Dade’s detachment 
Congress allocated funds for the conflict and it quickly earned the moniker the “Florida 
War” as the regular army scrambled to respond to the escalating crisis.  Unlike past 
                                               
2 George A McCall, John K. Mahon ed Letters from the Frontiers (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1974), 299-333.  
3 The Seminoles were comprised of often politically and geographically separate 
Indigenous populations in Florida. Given the lack of records tracking which group 
traveled where, I will refer to them all as Seminoles for the purpose of clarity. Hostilities 
between Indigenous peoples, their African allies, and Whites dates back well into 
Spanish Colonization.  The hostilities between the American government and the 
Seminoles that led to the Second Seminole War began with the First Seminole War and a 
Filibustering expedition known as the Patriot War.  For more Information on these 
foundational histories see: David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America 
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1992); James G. Cusick, The Other 
War of 1812: The Patriot War and the American Invasion of Spanish East Florida 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007). 
4 Patrick W. Rembert, Aristocrat in Uniform: General Duncan L. Clinch, (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1963), 93-111.; Mahon Second Seminole War, 136-140. 
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“Indian Wars” initial estimates of expenses for the conflict failed to anticipate how 
costly campaigning in Florida was.  From 1836 to 1839 the Federal budget quadrupled 
appropriations for the conflict. As the war escalated in scale, many of these funds went 
to paying civilian claims and the supplying of Volunteer regiments with horses and gear 
for their short campaign contracts.5  By the end of the war in 1842, the federal 
government spent between 30-40 million dollars fighting roughly 5,000 warriors at a 
time when the economy was teetering on collapse.6   
The Seminole’s society, and by extension military strategy were fragmented, 
varying from group to group, scattered through some of the roughest terrain east of the 
Appalachian Mountains.  The majority of fighting occurred in running ambushes that 
favored Seminole choice of ground and initiative. Seminoles frequently raided supply 
lines and harassed the fortified supply depots that dotted the Florida interior.  Doing so 
allowed Seminoles to continue pressuring the federal government in hopes of a peaceful 
resolution in their favor, it also allowed the often starving bands to resupply and 
continue fighting.  While there were vocal advocates in Congress, the media, and the 
military in favor of ceasing hostilities and giving Seminoles a reservation in Florida, the 
ever-escalating costs of the conflict and constant rotation of commanders made such an 
arrangement difficult to execute.7  As the United States poured more resources, 
manpower, and supplies into the conflict, attrition took its toll on the mobile Seminoles. 
                                               
5 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 325-327.  
6 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 325-327.  
7 Samuel J. Watson, Peacekeepers and Conquerors: The Army Officer Corps on the 
American Frontier, 1821-1846 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013), 188-190, 
202-203, 224, 232. 
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1836 saw a series of failed offensives against the large group of warriors formed by 
Osceola to destroy Dade’s detachment, as it sat mostly static along the Withlacoochee 
River.  The failures of these operations created a culture of unchecked spending as the 
Jackson and Van Buren Administrations grew frustrated at the cost and difficulties of the 
war.  The spending continued to grow as the Seminoles scattered further into the 
southern interior of the territory, forcing the Army to construct new roads, forts, and 
depots to give chase. By 1842, the majority of the territory was spider-webbed by 
military roads, and only a small group of 300 Seminoles fought on in the dense reeds of 
the Everglades.  
This study will argue that the formation, development, and eventual exploitation 
of the logistical supply lines have been a critically overlooked aspect of the Second 
Seminole War. Using seldom-analyzed records of the Quartermaster Department, new 
trends emerge in the typical narratives of the war, particularly surrounding the federal 
government's purchase, sale, use, and abuse of horses both in and outside of the theater 
of war.  The misapplication of horses negatively affected the operational, logistical, and 
financial integrity of American forces during the first campaigns of the Second Seminole 
War. The use of horses in the campaigns of Winfield Scott, Edmund P. Gaines, and 
Richard Keith Call illustrate an escalation of spending and expansion of logistical 
infrastructure that within a year, was dramatically exploited by a corrupt Quartermaster 
from St. Louis.  These chapters introduce new evidence and analysis into the traditional 
narrative of the Second Seminole War to showcase the fruitfulness of logistical records 
in studies of war and society during the antebellum period.  
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The operational-military aspects of the Second Seminole War have frequently 
come under academic scrutiny.  Arguably the most exhaustive analysis of the numerous 
campaigns in Florida is John K. Mahon’s History of the Second Seminole War. Mahon’s 
meticulous approach to each commander’s strategy, the political ramifications, and the 
human and financial cost to the conflict has yet to be matched by any other in the field.8 
However, aspects of military operations during the war play heavily into other works 
focused on professionalization of the American officer corps, arms dealing, and settler 
colonialism.9  Other smaller works with more limited scope have also made significant 
use of new evidence and Indigenous studies literature to aid their analysis of military 
operations in Florida.10 Samuel Watson in particular has identified a disparity between 
works on American military operations and research done on “Seminole Strategy.”11 
Indeed, the field is skewed heavily toward an American-centric point of view.  This 
                                               
8 There have been several other books since Mahon’s first publication in 1967 and the 
reprint in 1985 that have tried to match him in scope, but none have been as widely 
accepted as Mahon’s work.  For examples see:  Virginia Bergman Peters, The Florida 
Wars (New York: Shoe String Press Inc, 1979); John, and Mary Missall, The Seminole 
Wars: America's Longest Indian Conflict (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 
2004). 
9 Watson, Peacekeepers; David Silverman, Thundersticks: Firearms and the 
Transformation of Native America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016); Laurie 
Clark Shire, The Threshold of Manifest Destiny Gender and National Expansion in 
Florida (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).  
10  Joe Knetsch, Fear and Anxiety on the Florida Frontier: Articles on the Second 
Seminole War 1835-1842 (Dade City Florida: Seminole Wars Foundation Press, 2008); 
Belko William S. ed. America’s Hundred Years War: U.S. Expansion to the Gulf Coast 
and the Fate of the Seminole, 1763-1858 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
2011). 
11 Belko ed. America’s Hundred Years War, 156-180.  
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essay’s analysis of Seminole utilization of terrain and maneuvering around horse-borne 
units will address aspects of this disparity.   
Complementing operational analysis, but with far less academic attention is the 
study of nineteenth-century logistics.  Earl Hess, in his 2017 book Civil War Logistics, 
argued for the critical importance of historical analysis into logistical matters in 
conflicts.  Hess defined the field as two major branches, studies of transportation and 
studies of supply, neither of which, he asserted, gets enough attention for their role in 
campaigns.12 Besides Hess, few have taken up the mantle of analyzing logistics in the 
nineteenth-century, fewer still, during Jacksonian Indian Removal.13  The field has 
remained a necessary element in military education and security studies, but even these 
tend to oscillate between classics examples of Macedonian Armies and Carthaginian 
Elephants, to twentieth century examples like Operation Barbarossa.14   The nineteenth-
                                               
12  Earl J. Hess, Civil War Logistics: A Study of Military Transportation, (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2017), xi-xix.  
13 The majority of works on Logistics in North America analyze the British Campaigns 
during the American Revolution. See: Arthur Bowler, "Logistics and Operations in the 
American Revolution" Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War: Selected Essays, 
edited by Don Higginbotham (Santa Barbara: Praeger Press, 1978), 54-71; Matthew H. 
Spring, "With Zeal and With Bayonets Only" The British Army on Campaign in North 
America (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008); David Syrett, Shipping and the 
American War 1775-83: A Study of British Transport Organization (London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015); For works that address, to a limited extent, logistics of 
Indian Removal in this era see:  Christopher D. Haveman, Rivers of Sand: Creek Indian 
Emigration, Relocation, & Ethnic Cleansing in the American South (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2010); Mary E. Young, Redskins, Ruffleshirts, and Rednecks: Indian 
Allotments in Alabama and Mississippi, 1830-1860 (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, rev. ed. 2002); John T. Ellisor The Second Creek War: Interethnic Conflict and 
Collusion on a Collapsing Frontier (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010). 
14 Donald W. Engles, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978); Steve R. Waddell United States 
Army Logistics: From the American Revolution to 9/11 (Santa Barbara: California, 
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century, despite its major military conflicts and long standing effects on military 
thought, remains frequently overlooked, especially on the American-side of the Atlantic.  
The logistics of colonization and combating Indigenous forces in particular are 
frequently discussed in counter insurgency literature, but has thus far neglected 
American Indian Removal as a field critical to its study, favoring English-African 
examples instead.15  Yet, the logistics of the Second Seminole War have applications 
that affect both historical and securities-related fields.  From supplying Indigenous and 
national forces in hostile environment, to the limitations of animal-based supply lines, to 
a stark reminder of the ease of corruption within Indigenous and national Quartermaster 
organizations, there are inroads into several aspects of counter insurgency, small wars, 
and historical analysis of logistics understudied in these fields.     
Historical and anthropological work from the Indigenous studies field has also 
significantly analyzed the Second Seminole War.  While the field originated in the 
anthropological work of John Swanton’s early twentieth-century history of the “5 
Civilized Tribes of the Southeast,” modern scholarship has advanced considerably.16   
                                               
ABC-Clio Press, 2010); Department of the Navy, MCDP 4 Logistics, (Washington DC: 
Department of the Navy, 1997). 
15 Alexander B. Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the 
Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy,” Civil Wars, 
Vol. 9, No. 4 December 2007.; David M. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why 
Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1. Summer 
2004, 49-91.   
16 John Reed Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors Vol. 73. 
(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1922); James Leitch Wright, Creeks & 
Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration of the Muscogulge People. (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1986); Brent Richards Weisman, Like Beads on a String: 
A Culture History of the Seminole Indians in North Peninsular Florida (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1989).  
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New studies into the various kinship groups that made up the “Seminoles,” a Creek 
word, revealed the extent of Seminole society's fragmentation, and a more nuanced 
placement of black maroons within it.17 These studies have proven to be crucial to 
modern political debates and legal cases regarding the status of African-American 
maroons and Seminole blood quantum.18 Maroons and the makeup of Seminole Society 
are fields that military histories of the Second Seminole War continue to fail to address 
in any meaningful way in their analysis, often relegating the Seminoles into a simple 
antagonist rather than a complicated, intelligent, society at war.19  However, barring 
small asides into Seminole warfighting rituals, ethnohistorical studies have done little to 
illuminate Seminole military strategy.  The result leaves Indigenous studies 
investigations into Seminole society, culture, and beliefs a rich field that generally turns 
a blind eye toward the operational aspects of supplying and making war.    
The following chapters are arranged to create an arc demonstrating the utility, 
development, and exploitation of logistical supply lines flowing into the Florida War.  
The first chapter details the misapplication of horse-borne Volunteers during the first 
campaigns of the Second Seminole War.  It also discusses Seminole guerilla tactics, 
                                               
17 Weisman, Like Beads on a String; Kevin Mulroy, The Seminole Freedmen: A History 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007). 
18  Charles H. Fairbanks, "Ethno-Archaeology of the Florida Seminole” Milanich, T. 
Jerald, and Proctor, Samuel eds. Tacachale: Essays On the Indians of Florida and 
Southeastern Georgia During the Historic Period. (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1978); Melinda Micco, “Blood and Money: The Case of Seminole Freedmen 
and Seminole Indians in Oklahoma”   Tiya Miles and Sharon Patricia Holland. eds. 
Crossing Waters, Crossing Worlds: The African Diaspora in Indian Country (Durham, 
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2006). 
19 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 1-17; Belko, America’s Hundred Years War, 161-166.  
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striking the under defended supply wagons, dwellings, and depots in the Florida interior.  
Finally, chapter one analyzes the combination of American incompetence of command 
paired with Seminole exploitation of the landscape.  Wherever American forces met 
Seminoles, it was by Indigenous design, and more often than not the battlefield was 
divided by the Withlacoochee River, a major impediment to horse-borne operations.  
 The second chapter explores the relatively untouched field of logistics during the 
Second Seminole War, arguing that poor communication and egregious spending habits 
formed and solidified an adequate infrastructure of supplies during the war, much to the 
expense of the federal government. The chapter is a response to John Mahon’s challenge 
to the field to explain the mysterious 30-40 million dollar price tag of the war.20  Chapter 
two sheds light on the military-logistical side of spending, discussing difficulties with 
supply and transportation during the war.  The acquisition and transport of horses in 
particular, drove dramatic increases in credit the often isolated junior Quartermasters 
required to keep the operations in Florida supplied. These dramatic spikes in credit, 
coupled with the authority to make purchases unsupervised, culminated in opportunities 
for fraud explored in the third chapter.  
 Chapter Three analyzes the Court of Inquiry and Court Martial of Lt. Col. Joshua 
B. Brant, the Assistant Quartermaster General stationed in St. Louis, Missouri.  Brant 
executed at least fourteen separate schemes to steal funds from the federal government 
under the guise of supplying the Creek removal in Alabama, the Florida War, and Indian 
removal to Oklahoma.  Brant sat at the perfect juncture to pursue corrupt practices, with 
                                               
20 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 326-327. 
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distance from professional scrutiny, access to the major riverine highway of the 
Mississippi, and being a resident of St. Louis for ten years.  The Lieutenant Colonel had 
rank, location, and connections and used them to multiply his earnings in 1837 by five 
times the salary of a similarly ranked officer.  During an investigation by his bitter 
enemy, Quartermaster Capt. George Crosman, the sheer size and scope of Brant’s 
fraudulent practices were revealed. Detailed in the court proceedings are the major horse 
and storehouse-related fraud schemes that Brant conducted in Alabama, Florida, and 
Missouri.  Taken as a whole the Brant case demonstrates the multitude of ways 
Quartermasters, both civilian and military, exploited the resources and responsibilities 
given to them within this historical period.  
 Taken together the three chapters examine a small fragment of the extensive 
logistical business conducted between the United States Army, civilians, and Seminoles 
during 1836-1837.  Understanding the functions of the Quartermaster Department 
provides insights into the formation of logistical lines in the disastrous first campaigns of 
the war, and how the excesses in supply allowed for a massive fraud to take place.  In 
covering the application, formation, and exploitation of logistical lines of transportation 
and supply into Florida, this thesis adds further nuance to the traditional narrative of the 
expenses and events of the Second Seminole War.  The work of deciphering the 
manifold purchases and sales of animals, equipment, and forage is a gargantuan task, but 
this piece begins that effort and points to further fields of fruitful study in analyzing the 
logistics of the Second Seminole War, and Jacksonian Indian Removal more broadly. 
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CHAPTER II 
“A POSITIVE INJURY TO THE SERVICE”: THE MISAPPLICATION OF 
HORSEPOWER IN THE FIRST CAMPAIGNS OF THE SECOND SEMINOLE 
WAR, 1835-1837 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the winter of 1841, Thomas Sidney Jesup, the Quartermaster General of the 
Army, received a report commissioned earlier that year. Neatly etched in its yellow 
pages was the comment, “On this subject I speak with confidence: for if there be one 
belief connected with this war, more strongly and unwaveringly fixed in my mind than 
any other, it is that horses...have been, instead of a benefit, a positive injury to the 
service.”21 Colonel Henry Stanton, who was ordered to assess the effectiveness and 
expense of the removal operations in Florida from their inception in 1835 to 1841, was 
candid and unrelenting. “I believe that our failures in this vexatious war are mainly 
attributable to the undue reliance placed upon horse power [emphasis in original]. I 
believe the efficiency of our troops would be increased by the removal of every saddle 
from the country; a measure which would, at the same time, relieve the service of an 
expense which has well nigh broken down the army, and nearly exhausted the national 
treasury.”22  To Stanton, the reports and numbers he analyzed did not lie.  There were 
major systemic problems within the American Army’s occupation of Florida, and 
horses—their purchase, sale, use, and abuse—lay at the heart of it.   Stanton’s 
                                               
21 Henry Stanton (HS) to Thomas Jesup (TJ) January 20, 1841 NARA, RG 92, Box 604. 
7.  
22 HS to TJ January 20, 1841 NARA, RG 92, Box 604.  8. 
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excoriating report on the repeated failures of operations in Florida to capture and destroy 
the Seminoles offers a unique perspective on the war untainted by fear of dishonor, 
public censure, and failure.  Stanton’s work is a well-researched, often candid, critique 
of a larger institutional system that proved inefficient in the years that it had operated in 
the harsh environs of Florida.   
 The Second Seminole War remains an often-forgotten conflict in military history, 
yet from 1835-1842, it was constantly debated in urban newspapers, Congressional 
hearings, and small frontier towns.  What drove agitation among the American public 
was rarely the treatment of the Seminoles themselves, but rather the seemingly endless 
string of military failures and the massive pecuniary expense of the affair. Over the 
course of the conflict, seven separate commanders assumed control of operations.  All 
claimed small victories, each citing the defeat of a handful of Seminole warriors or 
burning down a smattering of dwellings deep in the interior of Florida. The war was far 
from the quick and glorious victory over an uncivilized foe the army envisioned.23  
Instead, the Second Seminole War was a long, brutal event for all those involved. The 
American Regular army suffered 1,466 deaths, which drained its small 7,000 man army 
to a mere skeleton.24  The Seminoles’ losses remain unknown, though estimates suggest 
anywhere from two to three thousand warriors were killed in combat with federal forces, 
                                               
23 Watson, Peacekeepers and Conquerors, 207-208, 228-233; John Hall, “A Reckless 
Waste of Blood and Treasure”: The Last Campaign of the Second Seminole War.” 
Moten eds Between War and Peace: How America Ends its Wars (Free Press: New 
York, New York. 2011), 76-80. 
24 The Army suffered a 14% mortality rate during the conflict. Watson, Peacekeepers, 
185.   
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and even more were lost to starvation and sickness while maneuvering in the interior.25  
Innumerable noncombatants in white and Seminole villages alike died at the hands of 
roving bands of warriors and mounted militia men, and even more were lost to seasonal 
illnesses and starvation exacerbated by near constant skirmishes and raids throughout the 
peninsula.26  
 Exponentially growing expenses and campaign failures characterized the early 
years of the war as some of the Regular Army’s most senior and storied commanders 
underestimated the skills of their foes and led unsuccessful and inefficient campaigns 
into the interior.  Winfield Scott and Edmund P. Gaines led simultaneous expeditions 
through the state. Scott drew on large numbers of militiamen who actively bought out 
markets of all subsistence, forage, and horses in the southeastern states to outfit their 
units. In spite of their mounts, Scott’s troops moved too slowly and failed to fight any 
significant numbers of Seminoles, doing little but incurring expenses and casualties in 
their march through the territory.  Gaines rushed boldly ahead only to be mired at a 
contested river crossing in the interior and surrounded by a superior number of 
Seminoles, far out of reach of his anemic supply lines. An even smaller local force led 
by General Duncan Lamont Clinch saved the sieged army from utter destruction. Both 
commanders were subsequently relieved by President Andrew Jackson, who in turn gave 
command to a civilian, Richard Keith Call, the Governor of Florida.   
                                               
25 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 122-123, 225. 
26 Watson, Peacekeepers, 186-187.  
 14 
 
 
Call’s campaign, characterized by its almost ubiquitous reliance on horse-borne 
militia units, launched the subsequent fall in 1836. It was more effective at consolidating 
Seminoles and engaging them, but failed to do so on the Army’s initiative. Instead Call’s 
troops fought on Seminole terms, dismounted, dispersed, and disorganized in swamps, 
failing to destroy or capture enough warriors to end the war. By the end of 1837, the 
Federal government had spent nearly 1.5 million dollars on the conflict, the majority of 
which was divided among military expenses, horses and forage costs, and hiring 
steamboats to transport all of it into the territory.  The major military actions during 
1835-1837 accomplished little, but provided a trail of expenses which Henry Stanton 
followed to provide his telling assessment of the war.   
 Scholarship on the military operations of the Second Seminole War has remained 
largely understudied in military history.  Since the publication of the second edition of 
Mahon’s History of the Second Seminole War in 1985, few scholars have ventured to 
analyze the conflict beyond specialized aspects unique to it.27 These works focus on 
topics such as the European-Indian arms trade, American purchase of bloodhounds for 
tracking Seminole Maroons, and daily life at various posts.28 Others put forth convincing 
arguments that the Florida War is the only militarily significant slave revolt in American 
history.29  Works on the U.S. military often only include military operations in Florida in 
                                               
27 Mahon, History of the Second Seminole War.  
28 Silverman, Thundersticks, 190-221, John Campbell, "The Seminoles, the 
“Bloodhound War,” and Abolitionism, 1796-1865." Journal Of Southern History 72, no. 
2: 259-302.;  Joe Knetsch, Fear and Anxiety on the Florida Frontier. 
29 Matthew Clavin, “It is a Negro, not an Indian War”: Southampton, St. Domingo, and 
the Second Seminole War,” Belko ed. America’s Hundred Years War, 181-209. 
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the context of longer trends, such as the professionalization of the American officer 
corps and the army as an institution.30  Samuel Watson has made important calls for new 
scholarship analyzing the Indigenous military strategy on display during the Seminole’s 
successful guerilla campaign, however, scholars have yet to tackle this challenge.31 This 
chapter addresses aspects of Watson’s challenge, looking at the skillful employment of 
environmental hazards by Seminole military leaders to prevent the expedient use of 
horse-borne troops by the U.S. Army.32   
 Scholarship on military logistics ignores the development of the Quartermaster 
Department, and its contribution to the failed campaigns in the early years of the Second 
Seminole War.33  Indeed, the only significantly detailed discussions found on the Second 
Seminole War-era Quartermaster Department resides in the Army's official history of the 
Quartermaster Department, of which only one page is dedicated to the entirety of the 
seven year war.34  Watson and Mahon both briefly touch on its development and 
shortcomings during Indian removal, but no analysis of it exists that looks specifically at 
the Second Seminole War.35 Yet, for those involved, the logistics of this conflict were 
                                               
30 Watson, Peacekeepers; William B. Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: The 
Army Officer Corps 1784-1861, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992). 
31  Samuel Watson, “Seminole Strategy, 1812-1858: A Prospectus for Further Research” 
Belko, Ed. America’s Hundred Years War, 155-181. 
32 While Watson focuses his efforts on discussing Seminole strategic motivations and 
goals for warfare, analyzing the Seminoles more as a nation state, I will focus more on 
their tactical decisions in regards to exhausting their enemies will to fight. Watson 
“Seminole Strategy,” 159-164.  
33 Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, 181-233; Waddell, United States Army 
Logistics, 41-45; Hess, Civil War Logistics, 5-16.  
34 Risch, Quartermaster Support, 183.  
35 Watson, Peacekeepers, 135, 237. 
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both a national embarrassment and indicative of the larger failures in leadership and 
training.   
 Stanton’s report acts as both a framework to better understand the shortcomings 
of the nineteenth-century American army’s reliance on horse-borne tactics as well as a 
platform to offer new analysis of the early campaigns of the conflict.  The campaigns of 
Winfield Scott, Edmund P. Gaines, Duncan Lamont Clinch, and Richard Keith Call with 
their horse-borne operations failed due to the brutal environment of Florida, 
unwillingness of volunteer units to dismount or obey, and the poor leadership and 
planning that left large numbers of casualties and expenses in their wake.  Why then, 
were horses so heavily relied upon throughout the early campaigns?  The returns of 
several Quartermasters, company commanders, and senior officers provide a wealth of 
perspectives that all help answer that question.  Stanton’s report gives the most concise 
analysis of the divergence of expense and effectiveness, and what may have been a 
cheap, useful, alternative to the horse had his suggestions been heeded by his superiors.  
 
STRAINS DURING THE EARLY CAMPAIGNS: SCOTT, GAINES, AND 
CLINCH (SPRING 1836) 
The disjointed initial campaigns of the Second Seminole War provided several 
lessons about operating in Florida that that commanders acknowledged, but failed to 
heed as they initiated their offensives. Generals Scott, Gaines, and Clinch each 
responded to differing circumstances within the Northern half of the Florida Peninsula.  
In the northeast, Winfield Scott wrangled an influx of regulars and volunteers in 
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Jacksonville and Picolata and took over two months to acquire his desired strength of 
5,000 men. From there, Scott advanced southwest toward the “Cove of Withlacoochee” 
in hopes of driving out the main body of Seminoles thought to reside there north into 
flatter country, where mounted volunteer units under the command of General Clinch 
could attack from all angles.36  Clinch, in the northwest of the territory, resided at his 
personal plantation and built a defensive structure named “Fort Drane” near it.  
Throughout most of the campaign, Clinch's force, composed mostly of Georgia 
volunteers, lacked supplies, suffered from sickness, and remained under constant 
harassment by Seminoles.37 To the southwest, and unbeknownst to Scott and Clinch in 
Tampa, Gaines and his 1,000-man regular army of the west marched north toward the 
centrally-located Fort King.  Moving well beyond the few supply trains that could be 
furnished in New Orleans and Tampa, Gaines’s force stumbled on the main body of 
Seminole belligerents and were surrounded in a seven-day siege. Clinch’s meager army 
later saved the starving encircled force.38  The initial campaigns were marked by the 
commander’s lack of knowledge of the terrain, failures to plan for supply trains, and a 
reliance on insubordinate mounted volunteers.  
                                               
36 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 142.  
37Rembert, Aristocrat in Uniform, 93-111; Mahon,  Second Seminole War, 136-140.;  
Michael Clark (MC) to TJ, Jan 5, 1836, National Archives and Record Administration 
(NARA), Record Group (RG) 92, Box 607; MC to TJ February 6, 1836, NARA, RG 92, 
Box 607; MC to TJ, February 19, 1836, NARA, RG 92 Box 607; MC to TJ, March 14, 
1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607; MC to TJ, April 28, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607.  
38 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 144-147; Henry Prince, Frank Laumer, ed. Storm of 
Bullets a Storm of Bullets: The Diary of Lt. Henry Prince in Florida 1836-1842 (Tampa, 
University of Florida Press, 2008.) 22-26. 
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Scott’s campaign from its inception set a precedent for the reliance on militia 
which almost immediately hampered the entire operation.  Upon receiving news of the 
massacre of Lt. Francis Dade’s Detachment on December 28, 1835, President Jackson 
named Winfield Scott the special commander of all forces operating in Florida.  Scott’s 
first order was to call up over 5,000 volunteers from states surrounding Florida and the 
territory, itself.39 Despite his calls for a limited number of companies of mounted militia, 
several formed in the fervor for taking vengeance on the Seminoles and earning easy 
federal pay.40  
By the end 1836’s spring campaigns, South Carolina and Georgia fielded a 
combined thirteen companies of mounted men to add to Scott’s regular infantry.41  These 
companies scattered south on their own volition, either joining Clinch’s command near 
Micanopy, awaiting Scott’s arrival in Jacksonville and Picolata, or raiding Indigenous 
villages on their own.42  The disorganization inherent in a patchwork, irregular army 
combined with poor lines of communication forced Scott to wait at Picolata, a small 
                                               
39 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 144-145.  
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depot on the St. John’s River south of Jacksonville, for the entirety of February.  The 
plan which Scott had presented to the president called for a force of 5,000 men and by 
early March, he only had 3,700 on hand.43 As supplies piled up around Scott, the 
commander was unwilling to send much ahead of his force.  The result was a bottleneck 
which forced both Gaines and Clinch’s forces to languish without rations for nearly three 
weeks of campaigning.  By the time Scott marched west in an effort to rescue the 
beleaguered Gaines and Clinch, their forces had met the enemy numerous times in a 
series of battles and ambushes.   
As Scott marshalled his forces in the east, General Duncan Lamont Clinch and 
Governor Richard Keith Call fought a series of dismounted skirmishes amidst near 
constant Seminole harassment while waiting as troops filtered into the isolated post of 
Fort Drane.  Clinch and Richard Keith Call operated for most of December 1835 against 
Seminoles in the northeastern part of the peninsula. There hostilities were commonplace 
before the war officially began in the final days of December.44  Call’s command was 
roughly 500 mounted Florida volunteers, and Clinch commanded a small 200-man 
detachment of regular infantry.  Their actions, usually small skirmishes along unguarded 
trails and roads, were an early indicator of how combat with Seminoles challenged the 
formal military movements favored by Scott and Call.  Call, in particular, favoring the 
speed of his mounted units, was unable to exploit their maneuverability.  Each 
engagement forced the troops to dismount on roads or in hazardous terrain and charge 
                                               
43 Mahon Second Seminole War, 142.  
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the dense patches of forest called “hammocks” in order to dislodge and scatter Seminole 
combatants.45   
Seminole tactics during the first years of the conflict relied heavily on skillful 
utilization of terrain to their advantage. There were at least two objectives behind each 
major Seminole engagement with United States forces. The first was to maintain 
initiative in selection of battlefield and timing of their strike.  During the attacks on 
Dade’s Detachment and Gaines’s army, Seminoles chose the terrain and timing 
carefully.  Striking when the leadership was at the head of long columns, or when the 
army was navigating a major river crossing. The second major objective in their tactics 
was manipulating the selected battlefield to ensure the army’s inability to follow or flank 
once the engagement commenced.  They did so by placing rivers, swamps, and 
hammocks between them and the army. These hazards provided cover for Seminole 
warriors, forced mounted units to abandon their horses—and by extension their 
mobility—and disrupted line of sight between U.S. forces as they waded into the dense 
foliage or water.  
When engaged, Seminoles placed themselves beyond the reach of infantry and 
mounted forces by selecting rivers and swamps to retreat to or strike from. On December 
31, 1835, Clinch and Call chased a large contingent of Seminoles to the mouth of the 
Withlacoochee River along the western Florida Coast.  Marching without supply trains 
and with only a few days rations, they caught Seminoles crossing to the southern bank of 
                                               
45 John Bemrose, John Mahon, ed. Reminiscences of the Second Seminole War 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1966), 45-55;  Louis Fleming to R.B. Gregory, 
December 28, 1835, Florida Historical Society. 
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the river.46 Unprepared for a major river crossing, Clinch’s small army relied on a single 
damaged canoe abandoned by their enemies to ferry the entire infantry force across.  
Call and his horse-borne command tried to swim the river, but turned back for fear of 
losing their mounts.47 The Seminoles struck on both sides of the river from the safety of 
their hammocks, wounding dozens and causing most of Call’s command to desert. The 
remaining mounted volunteers once again had to dismount and charge, after which the 
Seminoles eventually scattered and the remaining Americans commenced a hasty retreat 
back to Fort Drane.48 
 Matching Call in eagerness and aggression, General Edmund P. Gaines did not 
wait for approval of the War Department to respond to the destruction of Dade’s 
command.  Gaines and his force of roughly 1,200 infantry arrived at Fort Brooke on 
February 9, 1836.  Gaines received orders from the War Department to withdraw and 
take command of forces at Camp Sabine along the Texas border. However, he ignored 
them and advanced north toward Fort King.49 Marching with what little supplies they 
carried with them from New Orleans, Gaines’s force paused briefly to bury the dead of 
Dade’s command before reaching Fort King unmolested on February 22.50  Finding no 
supplies at Fort King and the wagon trains held up by Scott in Picolata, Gaines chose to 
                                               
46 Patrick, Aristocrat, 101-105. 
47 Bemrose, Reminiscences, 45-55.  
48 Bemrose, Reminiscences, 45-55.  
49 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 144; Senate Document, 244. 375-78, 381-388, 686-
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50 McCall, Letters, 321-333; Prince, Storm of Bullets, 9-15.  
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patrol south by way of Clinch’s recent battlefield along the Withlacoochee River. Upon 
reaching the river, Gaines’s force met the enemy while looking for a safe place to ford. 
From February 28 to March 6, Gaines underestimated the ease of campaigning in 
Florida as well as the skillfulness of his enemies, as his army was encircled and nearly 
destroyed by a superior Seminole force. Six days after leaving Fort King, while fording 
the Withlacoochee River near Clinch’s battlefield, mounted scouting elements received 
fire from the southern bank.51 One witness reported that a ball from the opening salvo 
caught Lt. James Izard in the “inner corner of the right eye and passed out the left 
temple.”52  Gaines's force then came under fire from behind as well as it was effectively 
encircled by a larger Seminole force thought to number in the thousands.53 The already 
starving army erected a breastworks—named Camp Izard for the late Lieutenant—and 
endured seven more days of near constant gunfire and assaults by Seminoles.  
From dressing in American uniforms, to attempting to set fire to the fields around 
the fortifications, the Seminoles used all manner of tactics to replicate their success 
against Dade’s men.54   The majority of the action around Fort Izard took the form of 
scattered Seminole salvos aimed at men standing above the shoulder-high breastworks.  
Their smaller caliber Spanish rifles tended to inflict little damage beyond bruises at the 
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400-yard range they fired from. The Seminoles attempted several tactics to close the 
gap.55  Lt. Henry Prince, stationed with his 4th Infantry in the besieged fort recorded, 
several of these attempts.  “The Indians being dressed like regular solders, some having 
blue great coats, some even the forage cap…approached the 4th Infy. Front very 
boldly…They would run in towards the fort (Fort Izard by the by), take near the side of a 
tree and fire back! We were completely deceived for some moments.”56  Prince reported 
that the disguised Seminoles made it as close as 100 meters before being recognized as 
imposters.  The ensuing skirmish lasted two hours, with no casualties. On another 
occasion Seminoles set the tall grass and palmettoes near the hastily erected breastwork 
on fire. Soldiers frantically shoveled sand on the flames as they neared.  It seemed that 
despite the Seminoles choice of ground, ingenuity, and manpower they were unable to 
press the advantage to a conclusion.  Their preferred style of fighting, separating U.S. 
Army troops from their mounts and leading them through exhausting chases through the 
hammocks, did not lend well to larger scale sieges.  
The besieged force, knowing how dire this situation was, made no attempts to 
strike out of their entrenchments, choosing instead to stay put and exchange gunfire. 
Gaines himself was injured taking an underpowered ball to the face and losing his two 
front teeth.57  Lt. Henry Prince described the experience: “I am sick at my stomach, the 
whole camp is scented by the carcass of a horse decaying outside the lines unburied...the 
bullets twitter over heads like a rush of blackbirds on a fine morning.” After three days, 
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rations ran out and the beleaguered force slaughtered horses for “horsehead soup,” a 
meal that Prince recalled was “spoken of in some praise.”58  The stalemate continued 
while Clinch, only thirty miles distant, awaited orders from Scott to relieve the army.59 
Scott’s inaction when it came to aiding his old rival Gaines cost the army three 
more days of suffering. Express riders who managed to make it through Seminole lines 
informed Clinch and Scott of the dire situation of Gaines’s army, and within days of the 
siege, Clinch requested Scott’s permission to strike.  Scott declined, with the excuse that 
Clinch did not have the stockpile to supply two armies.60  Scott was not entirely wrong, 
as the Quartermaster at Fort Drane could scarcely feed the sick volunteers within the 
palisades of the fort, much less Gaines’s starving army.61  Clinch again requested to 
move with Call’s mounted forces and strike the stationary enemy, as the days dragged on 
and Clinch’s scouts probing southwest to the battlefield frequently heard cannon fire.62  
Thanks to the concentration of Seminoles around Camp Izard, the roads between Drane 
and Picolata, usually fraught with ambushes, were clear and express horses made short 
work of the 90 mile distance.  
When Scott finally ordered Clinch forward, Clinch’s armies arrived at the worst 
possible time, mid-parley between American and Seminole emissaries.  Scott relented on 
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March 4, and Clinch’s infantry and mounted volunteers arrived during the early evening 
of the 6th. Their timing could not have been worse. The morning of the 6th, “a squad” of 
Seminoles “were discovered escorting a white flag,” and they wished to speak with 
General Gaines.  Captain Ethan Allen Hitchcock was sent to determine the cause of the 
parley, and returned “convinced that they are tired of the war & wish for peace.”63 The 
parties determined to meet later that day.  Lt. Henry Prince’s account claimed that “Capt. 
H. reports they have assented to every preposition [sic]” and during the meeting, 
Clinch’s small army arrived.64 Prince’s narrative of the event paints a vivid picture, 
“Mounted horsemen heave in sight! Troops behind them! Waggons! Packhorse! Droves 
of cattle!...Oh! Bad!! Our troops fire a voley[sic] at the Indians. They kill one. 
Heroickally[sic] & true to their character—warrior like, they return fire.”65 The skirmish, 
accidental or intentional, was short but sent a clear message—there would be no further 
armistice.  Clinch’s reinforcements, low on supplies themselves, could do nothing to 
exploit their temporary surprise or advantage.  Once again a river and dense hammocks 
precluded mounted action or safe river crossing.  Prince recorded the sentiment best, 
“what our army will do but fall back onto Fort Drane, I do not foresee.”66 On March 9th, 
Gaines turned over command of his troops to Clinch. 
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Meanwhile, Scott, while marching toward Drane in a “rescue operation,” realized 
he had little time left to reorganize his force and commence his delayed campaign.  The 
two aging rivals met briefly at Fort Drane on March 13, exchanged a cold greeting, then 
Gaines departed for the Texas border and Scott made hasty preparations to capitalize on 
the recent contact with the Seminoles.67  Scott’s forces divided into three wings: the Left 
commanded by Scott, the Center commanded by Clinch, and the Right commanded by 
the elderly General Abraham Eustice.68  Their orders were to commence operations on 
March 25th, the Left and Center marching from Fort Drane, and the Right marching 
from Picolata to goad the Seminoles into combat on the Army’s terms, ideally in an open 
landscape where the hundreds of mounted militia men would be of use for encirclement 
or flanking. 
As the three wings commenced their sweep south, they met incredibly harsh 
terrain and infrequent scattered resistance.  Eustice’s forces, caught up along small trails 
through the interior north of Peliklakaha, lagged behind the other wings and arrived at 
Tampa a week later than Scott’s plan intended.  Eustice’s Right wing was supposed to be 
the third pincer preventing the eastern route of escape for Scott’s planned decisive battle.  
With Eustice caught in the difficult terrain, the Seminoles divided into smaller bands to 
better harass Scott and Clinch’s forces on choice ground.  
Scott’s men engaged in several small skirmishes with Seminole groups, but 
Clinch’s wing encountered the stiffest resistance. Prince, marching with Clinch’s army, 
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reported one ambush along Thontlanassa Creek on the last day of March.  As the force 
marched along the creek they encountered deep swamps, “some officers on horse 
attempted but could not get along.  I saw one horse sink so that his face only was out of 
the water.  The men all crossed the place through—horses left behind.”69 Once the 
troops were separated from their mounts, Seminoles opened fire on them from a nearby 
hammock.  Prince describes the chaos of fighting on Seminole terms.  “We formed into a 
line firing & shouting as we ran into the scrub...before we got into the Cypress swamp 
when in the midst of a scratch grass pond, the grass higher than our heads—somebody 
said retire!,”  Prince recorded in his diary that night. “We enquired where the order came 
from—no answer… after this we charged a tremendous hammock.  On the right was the 
bloodiest of the fight. We pursued the Indians on their trail which was red with fresh 
blood nearly a mile to the river.”70  These confused, disjointed running fights through 
dense brush characterized most skirmishes between Americans and Seminoles.  The 
terrain and shifting lines of battle made reports of casualties for either side inaccurate.  
By the end of campaigning in May, Scott reported that his three wings had killed 
roughly sixty Seminoles and burned three empty villages.71 
While Seminoles were quite adept at choosing terrain that negated the advantages 
of massed horsepower, insubordination from within Scott’s army compounded the 
problems of campaigning through central Florida.   Placing aside the case of General 
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Gaines’s outright refusal to follow orders, the very volunteers that Scott relied on to see 
the campaign through posed as much a threat as they did a benefit. It is well documented 
in the literature of the early American army that regulars and militia did not often 
cooperate efficiently.72  Stanton observed later that “no man can serve two masters” and 
the militia in the early campaigns in Florida exemplified this.73  
During the Second Seminole War, disputes over rank, operational plans, and 
mobility plagued attempts at cooperation between regulars and volunteers.  While Scott 
consolidated his forces at Fort Drane in mid-March, hundreds of mounted volunteers 
arrived in Tampa from Alabama.  Astride horses purchased with the consent of the local 
Quartermaster, Major Joshua Brant, but without the approval of the War Department, the 
volunteers paraded through Fort Brooke.74 The demonstration culminated with the 
civilian-turned-colonel of the Alabama regiment, popularly elected to his station, 
demanding that the commander of the fort stand down. Bvt. Col. William Lindsey, an 
officer of thirty years, refused and accused the volunteers of “licentious and disorderly 
conduct.”75  The volunteers did not take this rebuff lightly, as Quartermaster Lt. D. F. 
Newcomb reported: “It was proposed to remove Col. by force from his command and 
place one of their own officers at the head of the troops.”76 When talk of mutiny fizzled, 
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the volunteers chose to disfigure the Colonel’s horse, shaving its mane and tale, then 
burning the Colonel in effigy in their camp.77   
Their final move of protest was to loudly venture from camp in search of 
Seminoles despite orders from Scott to await his arrival.78 Their jaunt into the swamps 
around Tampa resulted in nothing but the death of several horses due to poor supplies 
and the men’s ignorance of animal care.79 Stanton, speaking from hindsight, commented 
on such negligence, “knowing as every man of experience must know, that horses with 
such riders and for such service, are not only useless, but a positive incumbrance.”  He 
continued, “This abuse of horseflesh (for a large proportion of the animals thus 
employed are returned to the depths broken down or otherwise disabled) cannot for the 
interest and credit of the service be too soon, or too strongly discontinued.”80  
 Miscommunication, insubordination, poor geographic knowledge, and a cunning 
enemy curtailed any celerity the army achieved throughout the first years of 
campaigning in Florida.  As the weather turned from temperate spring days to the 
unbearable heat of summer, Scott sent increasingly desperate raids out from Fort 
Brooke, in hopes of stumbling onto another grouping of Seminoles he could strike.  No 
such body of Seminoles existed within the constantly shrinking range that the starving 
and broken horses at the Fort could manage. By mid-May 1836, Scott was recalled to 
Washington by Jackson to answer to a Court of Inquiry regarding the failures of his and 
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Gaines’s campaigns.   The majority of volunteer’s three-to-four month contracts expired 
and they departed for their home states.  Prince remarked that none from his 4th Infantry 
were sad to see the Alabama volunteers depart.81   
Command of operations in Florida was, by rank, to pass to either General Clinch 
or General Eustice.  The generals, both elderly veterans of the War of 1812, retired from 
the service in response.  Command fell next to Quartermaster General Thomas Sidney 
Jesup, who promptly declined and was rewarded with an order to command operations 
against Creeks in Alabama.  Jackson, unable to command the forces himself—though he 
certainly wanted to—received a letter from Richard Keith Call, Governor of Florida, 
asking for command.82 Jackson, hoping for a quick victorious campaign that following 
fall, agreed to give his old political ally and Governor of Florida the opportunity.83 The 
result mirrored Call’s prior operations with Clinch, an over-reliance on horse-borne 
volunteers stymied in their pursuit of Seminoles by the realities of campaigning through 
the swamps of the Florida interior.  
 
 A RIVER TOO FAR: CALL’S GRAND CAVALRY CAMPAIGN  
During the summer of 1836, Florida Governor Richard Keith Call received 
orders from the War Department to establish a plan to end the war in Florida.  To Call, 
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the flaw in Scott’s campaign had been the inability to move with speed and catch 
Seminole groups on favorable ground.  He believed the only real solution to the problem 
of Seminole elusiveness was an all-mounted offensive.84  During the summer between 
campaigns, heat halted all operations and sequestered the regular army in their scattered 
forts.  Call remained in his Tallahassee home sick in bed and drawing up drafts of his 
grand strategy.  His plan called for 2,000 horses, forage carried by packhorse to feed 
them for six months, and 2,000 volunteers to ride them.85  This horse-borne host would 
divide between Tampa and Tallahassee and use a large two-pronged pincer movement in 
order to force the Seminoles to consolidate in central Florida. Call would command the 
Tallahassee-based force, and Thomas Sidney Jesup would command the Tampa side. 
When the two pincers met, they would strike at the supposed Seminole stronghold at the 
Cove of the Withlacoochee River, where a decisive cavalry battle would destroy the 
Seminoles and end the conflict.86  Despite having witnessed his mounted volunteers 
break and flee under Seminole attack at the Battle of Withlacoochee half a year earlier, 
Call was convinced this offensive would be different.   
Call’s campaign suffered two major operational problems: reliance on the same 
mounted volunteers that had proven unreliable under Scott and the timing of the 
offensive’s execution. These two problems, compounded by logistical issues (covered in 
chapter two), left Call’s forces dismounted, hungry, and often disorganized. Call’s 
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problems with planning began in the summer of 1836, when the Governor, sequestered 
in Tallahassee, failed to inform leadership in the regular army of his plans.  Call’s plan 
required a massive overhaul of the infrastructure and supply depots in the interior of 
Florida.  He called for a network of depots along the St. Johns, Withlacoochee, and 
Hillsborough Rivers, in addition to the construction of at least six additional fortified 
depots along roads between Tampa and St. Augustine.  These depots, if supplied, would 
maintain forage enough for his two-thousand strong mounted army.87  They would also 
provide flexibility that was paramount to pursuing Seminole who moved more swiftly on 
foot than Scott’s infantry could.  In spite of the importance of these logistical centers, 
Call did not send orders to construct and supply these depots, as well as the order to 
resupply the numbers of horses in the territory, until early September.88  By time the 
scattered Quartermasters with authority to make purchases in the southeast got word of 
Call’s plan, October was nearly upon them.   
One benefit to Call’s campaign, though not to the national treasury, was the 
expansion of federal funds to extend to militia purchases of horses.  When Call’s request 
for mounted volunteer regiments went out, there were two successive waves of response, 
the first from Tennessee and the second from southeastern states. Mounted Tennessee 
volunteers, contracted to fight the Creeks in Alabama, made their way to Tallahassee in 
late August in time to be refitted for Call’s push south along the interior. Later, 
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regiments from southeastern states exploited the expanded funding of the war to outfit 
themselves with horses, driving up prices for army Quartermasters to exorbitant levels 
and opening the door for potential corruption.  Despite many of these units entering 
Florida with horses, few left with them.89 
As Call’s campaign commenced in mid-September, very little went according to 
his proposed horse-borne plan.  His army, marching with roughly 1,100 Tennesseans and 
pro-American Creeks, could not procure pack horses and instead traveled with wagons 
that proved too large for most of the trails they encountered moving south.90  General 
Jesup was nowhere to be found as far as Call knew, and his southern force was not in 
position to commence any movement whatsoever.91 On October 1, Call’s main force 
reached Fort Drane, finding the fort abandoned and burned earlier that summer.  Call, 
running low on rations and forage, was forced to wait until supplies from the depot at 
Gerrey’s Ferry reached them.92  On October 8, Call’s force, now supplied for another 
two weeks, turned south to once again attempt a crossing of the Withlacoochee River 
and to enter the Cove of Withlacoochee on the southern bank where the Seminole 
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stronghold was reportedly located.  Upon reaching the river four days later, Call’s forces 
met stiff Seminole resistance, and much like with Clinch and Gaines’s efforts, the army 
was unable to cross.  After almost five days of attempts, the army was nearly out of food 
and more importantly, forage.  The horses, unable to find grazing fields in the swampy 
terrain around the river, starved to death.  Roughly six hundred died during the march to 
and from the Withlacoochee.93  Volunteers burned saddles in bonfires to save themselves 
the trouble of carrying the publicly owned equipment back on foot.94  The thrust at the 
Seminoles was a failure and Call’s beleaguered force withdrew back to Fort Drane for 
resupply. 
The second major campaign action by Call’s mounted force occurred exactly one 
month later and again was stymied by the Withlacoochee River.  Unwilling to admit or 
unable to see that horses and a reliance on horse-borne action on inappropriate terrain 
was at the heart of his problems, Call requested an additional 500 horses from both 
Charleston and Savannah.95 The Quartermasters were able to meet his demands, but not 
before the second influx of mounted volunteers arrived at Fort Drane. With fresh faces 
atop fresh horses, Call was eager to ride back to the swampy regions along the 
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Withlacoochee to find the Seminoles again.  Consequently, the day Call’s force engaged 
the Seminoles around Wahoo Swamp, a few miles southeast of Clinch’s battle ground, 
thousands of pounds of forage, rations, and nearly 1,000 horses sat idle at Garrey’s Ferry 
without a location to which it could be shipped.96  Call’s mostly horse-borne army again 
marched from Fort Drane without any supply lines to the north bank of the 
Withlacoochee, this time crossing without resistance.  
Call ordered the nearly 2,500-man force to split, one force sweeping east along 
the River and one heading south below it.  Call’s army found the Cove abandoned.  The 
southern wing stayed on the south side of the river, and Call, commanding the eastern 
wing, re-crossed only to find the main body of Seminoles waiting for him in Wahoo 
Swamp a few miles southeast along the river.  Again, Seminoles had chosen ground to 
the great disadvantage of mounted forces.  The Tennesseans under Call’s command had 
to dismount into waist-deep mud to charge Seminole positions.  The southern wing was 
unable to respond to Call’s engagement, and they were, like others before them, left too 
vulnerable crossing the river and were pinned by Seminole gunfire.  Split, disorganized, 
and dismounted, Call’s force pushed deeper into the swamp only to find the main body 
had escaped long before his troops could remount to give chase.  Call’s forces, once 
again starving and confounded by the river, had no choice but to withdraw.97   
The failure at Wahoo Swamp cost Call his command, hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in horseflesh and supplies, and achieved nothing but reinforcing the Seminole 
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strategy of separating infantry from their mounts.  Not yet realizing his campaign was 
over, Call ordered his men to march east over sixty miles of swamp and dense forest to 
the depot of Volusia along Lake George.  Volusia, according to Call’s original plans, 
was supposedly stocked with forage and rations for at least thirty days.98  The supplies 
were in fact at Garrey’s Ferry, which had not received word of Call’s movements—due 
to poor roads and broken down express horses—until days after he began the trek east.   
As Call’s army reached the depot in late November, it found the stores mostly 
empty.  Supplies started reaching his army days later on December 2, the same day Call 
received a message notifying him that he was relieved of command by President 
Jackson.  Jackson had issued the order nearly a month and a half earlier. The expenses 
for both forays along the Withlacoochee cost the Quartermaster Department hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in replacement horses, steamboat transit, and forage from already 
ballooning market prices in the southeast.  Call received criticism from Congress and the 
regular army over the “extravagant costs,” especially given that his second offensive, in 
mid-October, was technically not even authorized by order of the President.  Jackson 
ordered Jesup to assume command of the operations in Florida that December.  In 
response he resigned, but Jackson, furious at another resignation, refused to accept it.99  
Jesup, without recourse, assumed command of Seminole removal while Winfield Scott 
took charge of Creek and Cherokee Removal into 1837.  Jesup would find little success 
in his operations, but served the longest tenure of any commander in the Florida theater.  
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Under Jesup another regiment of regular dragoons came into service with much the same 
results as Call’s mounted volunteers.  Constantly ambushed and forced to dismount, the 
2nd Dragoons did little but garner expenses and use their mounts to desert the service.100 
 
CONCLUSION 
The first campaigns of the Second Seminole War exhibit several similarities in 
the employment of horses, the commanders who deployed them, and Seminole tactics to 
check their use.  Henry Stanton, while reviewing the expenses related to horse-borne 
operations, complained in his report, “The department is constantly burdened with the 
care and expense of a considerable number [of horses]...disabled and broken down by 
improper usage.” He discovered through Quartermaster returns that before campaigning 
even began, one fourth of all horses deployed were broken from escort and scouting 
services.101 If a quarter of horses never saw the campaign trail, much less a battlefield, 
why were commanders in the first campaigns so insistent upon using them?  Here, 
Stanton failed to look beyond his personal problems with militia commanders.  Historian 
Samuel Watson is more insightful, in his comparison between American campaigns and 
their European counterparts.  “Cavalry was virtually nonexistent either because terrain 
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forced it to dismount (as was often the case with the Second Dragoons in Florida) or 
because battle commanders had little idea to use it effectively,” he argued.102   Even 
“Winfield Scott, the army’s foremost tactician, who was certainly familiar with 
European cavalry employment” failed to use mounted forces in any competent manner. 
Commanders too frequently thought the Florida landscape and theater of war could 
support large scale mounted operations despite mounting proof to the contrary.  
The failures during Scott and Call’s campaign characterized their inability to 
wield the manpower and horsepower available to them properly. Both Scott and Call had 
considerable pools of mounted regiments to utilize, an adequate system of logistical 
support, and surprisingly accurate intelligence of Seminole positions around the 
Withlacoochee, yet no offensive could achieve the celerity or advantageous position 
needed to succeed in their goals. Scholarship has criticized Scott, in particular, for being 
ignorant of the terrain in which he fought, leading to his slow slog south to Tampa with 
few engagements to show for it.103  Scott’s failure to anticipate the poor condition of 
roads in Eustice’s wing and the resistance that met Clinch’s are fair criticisms supporting 
that point.   
Call’s campaign, more so than Scott’s, demonstrates the accuracy of Watson’s 
argument regarding incompetence.  Call operated in northwest Florida, less than one 
hundred miles from his home in Tallahassee, with large numbers of mounted volunteers 
only to again and again witness the same results when fighting Seminoles.  When 
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fighting alongside Clinch and during his own two offensives, Call consistently failed to 
cross or anticipate contested crossings of the Withlacoochee River, where the Seminoles 
had foiled attack after attack, and nearly destroyed Gaines’s army.  Despite this 
knowledge, Call attempted twice to cross the river near the same spot his force was 
attacked the year prior. Confounding poor decisions on an operational level, Call’s 
troops were ignorant of proper care for their federally purchased horses.  They wantonly 
let their mounts die in massive numbers, abandoned them in charges through nearly 
impassable terrain, or attempted to take them through rivers while drawing lethal fire 
from Seminoles. In these campaigns, comparisons between the regular troops’ treatment 
of public property like horses cannot be readily made since all regular units were 
infantry with only the officers mounted.  Thus the Army’s campaign failures rest firmly 
on the shoulders of the theater commanders, the untrained mounted volunteer regiments, 
and the successful exploitation of terrain features by Seminole warriors.   
Henry Stanton concluded his scathing report with a proposed solution to the 
horse problem in Florida, one that allowed his Quartermaster Department to shine while 
taking away the primacy of militia units in campaign plans.  Stanton pushed back against 
the rigid European-style campaigning. “Formal military movements and operations selon 
les regles [by the book] are considered entirely out of place in Florida,” he argued.  
Instead, Stanton suggested warfare in Florida should “resemble hunting expeditions,” 
where dismounted small squads of regulars were “prepared for an equal race through the 
swamp and hammock and over plain and prairies with our lightly armed, lightly 
bagged[sic] and wily adversaries.” Supplying these men would be dozens of fortified 
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supply depots along the navigable rivers into the interior when roads could spider web 
out to more remote regions, eliminating the need to rely on mounted units.  Stanton 
asserted such reorganization would eliminate the need for long baggage trains, thousands 
of horses, and sluggish campaign movements.  If Stanton’s complaints and suggestions 
were heeded at any level, the campaigns in the remaining two years of the war did not 
show it.104  Instead, reliance on the 2nd Dragoons, mounted volunteers, and large 
formations of regulars remained popular until the final year of the war, when so much of 
the campaign took place over the everglades that even infantry could not move without 
navy flatboats.105 
Stanton’s report by its very existence and candid nature demonstrates the 
importance of the Quartermaster Department during the first campaigns of the Second 
Seminole War.  These scattered officers were responsible for supplying the large 
campaigns, equipping and organizing many of the volunteer units, and enabling much of 
the failure and excess that took place from 1835-1837.  However, this was not due to 
their incompetence; rather Quartermasters’ were too responsive, and their system 
functioned too well given their near complete freedom to spend federal funds in pursuit 
of each commander’s lofty demands.  The following chapter will explore how the supply 
lines of the early campaigns of the Second Seminole War took shape, met the demands 
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of the various campaigns, and spent extravagantly in the name of “immediate 
necessity.”106 
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CHAPER III 
A DAY LATE, BUT NEVER A DOLLAR SHORT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE FIRST CAMPAIGNS OF THE SECOND 
SEMINOLE WAR, 1835-1837  
 
INTRODUCTION    
Two weeks after the destruction of Lt. Francis Dade’s detachment outside of Fort 
King,  Lt. Michael M. Clark sat at his writing table roughly one hundred miles northwest 
in Fort Drane reflecting on his situation.  The fort had been selected as the rendezvous 
point between Generals Winfield Scott, Duncan Lamont Clinch, and General Edmund P. 
Gaines’s separate campaigns against the Seminoles.  It was located at the furthest point 
from any feasible route of supply. Attacked almost daily by bands of Seminoles, and 
plagued by outbreaks of cholera and measles, Drane was hardly an ideal depot for 
resupply for any army—much less three.107  While most of the senior staff outside of the 
territory boasted to Congress and the public of a quick conclusion to the war, Clark had a 
different opinion.  Writing to the Quartermaster General of the Army, Thomas Sidney 
Jesup, the young lieutenant grimly predicted “This indian war is not to be a small 
business.”108   
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Lt. Clark was right. Both militarily and economically, the seven years of the 
Second Seminole War severely tested the limits of the 7,000-man regular army and its 
meager officer corps. The expense of the Florida war nearly eclipsed the national budget 
for over half its duration.109  During the first three years of campaigns commanders 
called for over 3,000 men, most of whom were untrained mounted volunteers, to 
descend into Florida.  By the conflict’s end, over half of the regular army and roughly 
10,000 militia had served at least one campaign in the unforgiving environments of 
Florida.110  Funding a large expansion of the military and numerous unsuccessful 
campaigns so far from the established national infrastructure was incredibly demanding 
on the American economy. Adding to the complexity of funding the war, the economy 
suffered severely during the Panic of 1837.  It was the largest economic recession the 
United States endured before the Great Depression, caused chiefly by President 
Jackson’s campaign against the national bank system.111  Initial requests for funding 
during the war hardly exceeded $10,000, but by 1838 the federal government was 
appropriating over $1.5 million of the annual budget for war time expenditures.  Civilian 
claims for payment of requisitioned items mounted and market prices skyrocketed.  By 
war’s end in 1842, the federal government had spent anywhere between $30-40 million, 
with little to show for their efforts.112 Florida citizens remained convinced they were still 
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in danger, and some 300 Seminoles and maroon allies remained defiant in the northern 
Everglades.113  
Where exactly the $30-40 million was spent on the conflict remains elusive 
within the scholarship. Appropriations bills, the Armed Occupation Act of 1842, and 
civilian claims shed some light on the massive figure.114  However, the early logistical 
infrastructure laid in the first campaigns of the war also contributed to the ballooning of 
expenses to such staggering rates in such a short period of time. Yet historians have 
ignored this vital topic. Besides Erna Risch’s 1962 official history of the Quartermaster 
Department, no academic scholarship exists on the formation and development of 
logistics during the Second Seminole War.115 John K. Mahon, arguably the foremost 
scholar on the conflict, claimed in 1985 that no scholar had attempted to pursue a 
detailed analysis of the expenses incurred during the seven years of war.116 Since then, 
no such analysis has materialized.117  For scholarship on the early American Army, other 
themes have taken precedence over analysis of logistics: the development of civil-
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military relations leading to the American Civil War, the role of the army on the frontier, 
and the origins of a unique “American way of war.”118  Coverage of the Second 
Seminole War in military history has stagnated following Mahon’s history of the war in 
1985, and new publications in Indigenous Studies of Seminole and maroon relations 
have taken the fore.119   
Analyzing the early United States Army’s Quartermaster Department during the 
Second Seminole War through its reports and correspondence provides new insights into 
both the massive expenses incurred throughout the war and the logistical reasons behind 
the military failure to pacify the elusive Seminoles.  The sources reveal important 
contrasts between the spring and fall campaigns of 1836. 
  During Winfield Scott’s and Richard Keith Call’s campaigns, poor 
communication, steep market prices, and difficulty attaining ship charters wracked the 
Quartermaster’s Department.  Officers on the ground lacked the funds or authority to 
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solve the supply problems they encountered. During Richard Keith Call’s campaign in 
the fall, the War Department granted Quartermasters the freedom to purchase with near-
impunity.  This action transformed the infrequent shipments of supplies that plagued 
Scott’s campaign into steady—often overflowing—stream of forage and animals by 
order of Governor Call at great cost to the federal government. The expense of the early 
campaigns with their required material, manpower, and funds shocked American civilian 
and military leadership alike.  As military failures mounted, the pressure to expand the 
size and scope of operations across the Florida peninsula created a unique climate of 
wanton spending in the name of “immediate and necessary” needs.120  
DISJOINTED DEVELOPMENT: SUPPLYING THE FIRST CAMPAIGNS OF 
THE SECOND SEMINOLE WAR, SPRING 1836 
Poor coordination, lack of authority, and the inability to find proper shipping 
charters hobbled the various quartermaster offices that struggled to keep the scattered 
armies and forts of Florida stocked and fed during the first campaigns of the war. The 
sporadic demands for fresh horses, forage, and rations precipitated two major arteries of 
supply flowing into distribution depots in Florida. From the east, steampackets and 
schooners transported supplies of all description. The vessels stopped at cities along the 
eastern seaboard and eventually unloaded their cargo in St. Augustine.  From the coastal 
fort, horse-drawn wagons transported supplies to Picolata, a major Army depot along the 
St. John’s River.  Picolata acted as the largest eastern distribution point during the first 
120 HS to TJ, January 20, 1841, NARA, RG 92, Box 604. 
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six months of the war, stocking caravans of wagons that trundled southwest to the 
scattered forts and camps in the interior.  In the west, another major river aided the flow 
of supplies.  The Mississippi facilitated easy supply lines between St. Louis, the greater 
Midwest, and New Orleans.  New Orleans’ extensive docks allowed for relatively fast, 
though rarely consistent, shipping to Fort Brooke just outside of Tampa, which acted as 
the other major terminus for the two supply arteries.  From Fort Brooke supplies were 
loaded on to wagons and distributed into the western half of the territory. Some supplies 
trickled in by caravan into Tallahassee from Georgia and Alabama, but use of boats 
facilitated far more efficient and reliable transportation of supplies. The lack of any 
major port in the northwest portion of the peninsula created major supply problems for 
General Clinch and Governor Call when operating in that part of the territory.121   The 
two major arteries into Florida were responsible for the majority of supplies and animals 
brought into the conflict; while the western branch served a grim second duty in 
transporting removed Indigenous peoples to New Orleans with each successive run.122   
For Quartermasters, three factors drove the creation of these logistical arteries: 
consistency of communication, availability of ships to charter, and easy access to 
purchasable wagons and horses.  When Quartermasters purchased anything, they 
required authorization. Quartermasters in the early years of the war were usually junior 
officers often working in tandem with a more senior supervisor who received orders 
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from Washington or the commander in charge of the theater.123  If no ranking officers 
were near, Quartermasters wrote to the Quartermaster General’s office in Washington 
City for authorization and direction.124  Without proper authorization the purchases made 
by Quartermasters-whether commissioned officers of the army, militiamen, or civilian 
proxies-were fraudulent and prosecuted by the Department of Treasury.125  The 
campaigns of General Scott and Governor Richard Keith Call provide fruitful windows 
into the formulation, problems, and eventual solidification of two major supply arteries 
into the Florida War.  By better understanding how these often unsupervised lines of 
logistics functioned, the later abuses and frauds committed by officers against the 
Quartermaster and Treasury Departments fit more clearly into the backdrop of wanton 
spending and poor decision making by commanders.   
During the first six months of the war, efficient communication was seldom the 
reality, as poor estimates for needed funds, confusion in authority, and sheer 
incompetence, afflicted the coalescing supply arteries with near constant problems.  The 
accounts of these early days recorded by junior officers stationed in cities provide a 
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purchased by Territorial Qr. Master John Saw for the use of Militia whose services were 
assumed by the United States, August 22, 1842, NARA, RG 92, Box 607; Court-Martial 
of Lieutenant Colonel Joshua B. Brant, June 15, 1839, NARA, RG 153, CC 437.   
 49 
 
 
window into the communication and supply problems.  Lt. Michael M. Clark in Fort 
Drane, Lt. John L’Engle in Charleston, and Maj. Isaac Clark in New Orleans, among 
others, wrote frequently of their problems acting as Quartermasters during the formative 
days of the Second Seminole War.  The letters of these officers offer a useful and often 
candid glimpse at the logistic support of the Florida War. 
Fort Drane was located at a particularly vulnerable point on the military and 
logistical campaign map of Florida, positioned about one hundred miles west of Picolata, 
which in turn was about eighteen miles overland from St. Augustine.126  At the 
commencement of hostilities, Fort Drane was one of the most difficult locations in the 
territory to keep supplied.  Vast stretches of often swampy and unpatrolled roads made 
the overland supply runs to the fort take an unusually long eight to nine days.127 Lt. 
Clark was ordered to take up the role of Quartermaster in the fort to support Clinch and 
Call’s raiding operations based around Micanopy and Newansville.  Clark, upon 
receiving his directives, acted on his own initiative to establish a section of the future 
supply artery from Jacksonville to Picolata by way of steam boat. He left a civilian 
proxy in his place as he departed for Fort Drane:  “Should any US Property be shipped to 
this place William J.D. Hart will take charge of it, all stores should however be sent to 
                                               
126 Fort Drane sat over 150 miles from Florida’s largest city of Tallahassee making 
supply overland impracticable.  Picolata no longer exists. It is now private farm land 
divided among several owners. Fort Drane sits just south of Micanopy, which is roughly 
12 miles south of Gainesville.    
127 MC to TJ, February 6, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607. Wagons in this era could 
travel the roughly one hundred miles in four or five days with good horses and ideal road 
conditions. In Florida, neither condition was consistently met.  
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Picolata if possible.”128  Throughout the first six months of the conflict Picolata served 
as a critical depot on the eastern side of the St. John’s River guarding a large bridge 
across the deep waterway.  Small schooners and most steam boats could navigate the 
river to penetrate deeper into the Florida interior, instead of using the docks at St. 
Augustine.129  Because few rivers connected the coasts to the interior, Quartermasters 
adjusted their requisitions to facilitate long, dangerous journeys by horse-drawn wagons 
along roads in the unforgiving landscape of Florida.  
 Clark, stationed in Florida prior to the war, understood the grim state of supplies 
as he established his depot in Fort Drane.  Upon arriving, he reported to the 
Quartermaster’s Department that “the resources of the country as regards forage is 
nearly exhausted-there is little or no fodder to be obtained.”130  Clark had heard from 
supply trains that a “considerable number of troops have been asked for,” but no clear 
number or timeline were available to him.131 Acting again of his own volition, Clark sent 
letters to Savannah and Picolata, attempting to set up consistent networks for the supply 
of forage and wagons to facilitate overland travel to the isolated fort.132  Unbeknownst to 
Clark, General Scott was busy marshalling troops near Jacksonville, and the lieutenant’s 
letters were largely ignored in the logistical tumult.133  
                                               
128 MC to TJ, December 31, 1835, NARA, RG 92, Box 607.   
129 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 279. 
130MC to TJ, January 5, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607. 
131MC to TJ, January 5, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607. 
132 While there is no evidence of the letters themselves, Clark reported in his report of 
January 5, 1836 that $4,000 dollars be remitted to Lt. L’Engle in Savannah for forage 
costs.; MC to TJ, January 5, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607.  
133MC to TJ, March 2, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607; MC to TJ, March 14 1836, 
NARA, RG 92, Box 607.  
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As Scott and Gaines commenced their campaigns into the interior, the lack of 
information provided to the officer at the proposed meeting point of Fort Drane was 
reflective of larger communication issues between the commanders in theater.  Clark 
was often at a loss to predict the quantity of men coming his way, and to estimate the 
quantity of supplies that had actually been sent for him to store. He wrote as Scott’s men 
marched from Georgia and northeastern Florida in January, “Col. Stanton had been 
directed to forward to Picolata a quantity of forage...even a probable estimate cannot be 
made.”134 The troops stationed at Fort Drane, two hundred fifty regulars and a lonely 
regiment of mostly sick militiamen from Georgia, “looked anxiously” for reinforcements 
while fighting frequent skirmishes with Seminoles sometimes as close as one mile from 
the palisades.135 As the siege of Camp Izard thirty miles to the south grew more 
desperate, Clark recorded how dire the situation was at the isolated fort, “Genl Scott has 
not yet arrived and it is not known here when he will leave Picolata...Our means of 
transportation is very limited what arrangements may have been made by Genl Scott I do 
not know.”136  When Scott finally arrived at Drane on March 13 with dozens of wagons 
of supplies in tow, he found the fort and its Quartermaster ill-equipped to fulfill the 
needs of his campaign.  Rather than maintaining Drane as the lynchpin in his supply 
lines, he redistributed the wagons between Fort Brooke (Tampa) and a newly established 
depot north of Picolata, Garrey’s Ferry.137  Scott wisely favored coastal access, as 
                                               
134MC to TJ, January 11, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607.  
135MC to TJ, February 6, 1836 NARA, RG 92, Box 607; MC to TJ, February, 19 1836, 
NARA, RG 92, Box 607.  
136MC to TJ, March 2, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607. 
137 Scott to Clinch March 4, 1836, Congressional Serial Set Senate Document 224, 301. 
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internal depots like Drane proved to be too difficult to resupply. Governor Call chose to 
neglect this lesson later that year.  Fort Drane was abandoned in July 1836, and 
subsequently burned by Seminoles as the final supply trains withdrew to Gerry’s Ferry 
and Fort Brooke.138  
Getting forage, rations, and horses to far flung forts like Drane from coastal cities 
presented a host of problems.  While in more frequent communication with both 
commanders and the Quartermaster General’s office in Washington, Quartermasters in 
larger trade hubs along the east coast and in New Orleans had to contend with the local 
markets and demand for boats.  As logistical requirements for the campaigns in Florida 
mounted, markets around more established Florida cities like Tampa, St. Augustine, and 
Jacksonville quickly ran out of supplies for the army.139  While preparing for his 
campaign, Scott recognized that the meager supplies around Jacksonville would not be 
enough, and ordered Quartermasters along the east coast to begin accruing supplies.  As 
he was unfamiliar with the geography, successful Seminole use of terrain against horse-
born operations, and the general hazards the Florida climate presented to the animals, 
Scott ordered large numbers of the animals and feed to be shipped to St. Augustine and 
Picolata.140  His initial requests called for forage and horses to facilitate anywhere from 
500 to 1,700 mounted troops, much to the disbelief of Quartermasters stationed in 
Florida. Feeding animals that eat roughly twenty pounds of grain forage a day presented 
                                               
138 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 175.  
139 Winfield Scott (WS) to John L’Engle (JL) February, 12 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 
604; Francis Newcomb to Isaac Clark March 30 1836 NARA, RG 92, Box 607; JL to 
TC, September 28, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604. 
140 WS to JL February 12, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604 
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a massive logistical problem.141   Feeding the men that rode the horses was another.  Lt. 
Francis S. Dancy wrote to General Jesup from Tallahassee, “in my arrival here I found 
two companies in this vicinity without a barrel of pork, and but a barrel of flour, and the 
nearest supplies 70 miles distant.”142 These shortages dictated that any supplies for major 
campaign actions would need to be obtained outside of the territory. The responsibility 
for purchasing and shipping such large quantities of supplies fell to officers in coastal 
cities like Savannah and Charleston. Markets there were better stocked, but uncharted 
ships were not plentiful even in these busy ports.143 
Savannah and Charleston played important roles in the storage, purchase, and 
shipment of supplies south into Florida.  Given their location and port capacities, the two 
cities and the Quartermasters assigned to them received large amounts of federal funds 
to supply the war effort.  This was due primarily to the significant numbers of militia 
mustered within the cities, and the ever-escalating calls for more horses and forage by 
Scott and Call in their respective campaigns.  Lt. John L’Engle, the lone Quartermaster 
in Charleston, felt the burden of the multiple demands on his station.  His initial reports 
for war expenses for the city were optimistic at best, ill-informed at worst.  In January of 
1836, L’Engle believed his request for a $10,000 allowance was more than enough to 
                                               
141 Using the 1,700 horses estimate, assuming they were both “light” thousand pound 
horses and healthy, Quartermasters required over 1 million pounds of forage to keep that 
number of horses fed for a stretch of 30 days. This calculation does not take into account 
how many were draft horses or mules. That number would be difficult to accurately 
express given that most manifests of horses and mules were not labeled for their 
purposes once in theater.  
142 Francis S. Dancy to TJ February 10, 1836, NARA, RG 92 Box 601.  
143 L’Engle shipping manifests/complaining of ships in early 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 
603. 
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supply the militia mustering in the city as well as chartering ships to carry forage and 
horses.144   By the following month, L’Engle was spending double his requested amount 
for chartering schooners and steam packets alone, the majority of which were used to 
transport volunteer units and their mounts. These vessels adjusted prices and often only 
agreed to one-time charters for rates well above the market value.145 Within days of the 
last of seventeen vessels leaving Charleston on February 13th, General Scott requested 
that L’Engle make purchases of forage for the now thousands of horses operating in 
Florida.146 Scott’s order came after L’Engle had shipped over 90,000 pounds of hay to 
Picolata, much of which could not be stored in the depot’s poorly constructed 
warehouses.147 Charleston remained a major purchasing point throughout the war as both 
Scott and Richard Keith Call levied particularly large quantities of supplies from the 
overworked Quartermaster.  
 South of L’Engle, Lt. Lawrence Dimmock encountered price-gouging at the 
Savannah market which diminished his ability to facilitate the armies without requesting 
dramatically increased amounts of funds.  Dimmock reported that he “placed under my 
charge here, 190 horses and at a great expense, corn being $2 per bushell. And hay $1.75 
                                               
144The average price for a horse broken for riding or draft purposes cost $70-100.  
During the Second Seminole War, prices went anywhere from $150-300 for a single 
horse.  JL to TJ, January 28, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.   
145 Vessels chartered in Charleston For January-February 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 
604; Horses sent to Garry’s Ferry by Lt John L’Engle August 9 to November 3 1836, 
NARA, RG 92, Box 604. 
146 WS to JL February 12, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.   
147 L’Engle shipping manifests/complaining of ships in early 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 
603; JL to TJ, January 28, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.  Any hay unable to be stored 
in warehouses was left exposed to the often rainy weather in Florida, producing high 
levels of rot.  
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per hundred.”148  Dimmock associated these price hikes with Scott’s calls for militia 
units to muster in the city. He lamented having to equip volunteer regiment officers with 
horses for $2,500 at the federal government’s expense.149 Compounding Dimmock’s 
problems were the “few steamboats” for hire in the port.  Dimmock considered that if 
the army could not transport supplies overland it would have to accept the “extreme” 
rates of the local steamboat captains looking to profit from the urgency of Scott’s 
campaign.150    
Steamboats and schooner problems were more exaggerated along the western 
artery of supply from New Orleans to Fort Brooke during Scott and Gaines’s campaigns.  
Major Isaac Clark initially met early demands for supplies following Gaines’s departure 
from the city only to receive reports that the articles he had shipped to Tampa were 
damaged. Clark had overestimated the port and depot size in the small coastal city, and 
as a result, supplies, primarily forage, rotted on the ships. These supply troubles and the 
overall cost of shipping, well over $52,000 for February of 1836, frustrated Clark.  
                                               
148 Lt. Lawrence Dimmock (LD) to TS Jesup February 26, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 
601.  
149 Animosity between regulars and militia officers is well documented within the 
literature of the Early American Army. The Second Seminole War saw several instances 
of insubordination, and hostility between parties.  Dimmock in this case commented 
often about the expenses Militia incurred on his operations in Savannah. See LD tom TS 
February 26, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 601; R.C. Payton to TS Jesup January 27, 1836 , 
NARA, RG 92, Box 602.  For Regular-Militia animosity see Watson, Peacekeepers and 
Conquerors, 130, 196-197, 199-200.  
150  LD to TJ February 26, 1836 NARA, RG 92, Box 601; The going rate of corn in 1836 
was closer to $.75 a bushel, and hay closer to $.25 depending on region.   
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Joining the army in 1812, he was a trained artillery officer, not a Quartermaster.151  He 
wrote “I regret that a appropriate Quartermaster has not been sent to my assistance.  I am 
compelled to be in this office the whole time therefore cannot attend to all the forts left 
without even a guard.”152 As Scott took over operations in March of 1836, supply 
problems continued to plague the gulf expanse of the western artery.  
The correspondence of Maj. Clark and the Quartermaster in Tampa, Lt. Francis 
D. Newcomb, was illustrative of the problems professional incompetence and boat 
shortages imposed on the western supply artery.153  Lt. Newcomb at Fort Brooke was 
frequently frustrated by Clark’s unwillingness to ship enough vessels to Tampa 
following the damage to the forage in February.  Newcomb was forced to act above the 
authority of a lieutenant and make major local purchases to supplement Clark’s 
inadequate shipments.  Of his ship problem, Newcomb wrote “I have bought everything 
that there is in the harbor...and have had to make some considerable calls upon my 
genius” to see that Scott’s orders were filled and “as yet, he has had no occasion to 
complain.”154  In late April following the disastrous withdrawal from Fort Drane, Scott 
made his demands known. “General Scott will have about 4000 men...and the supply for 
them for two months must be had from this post,” Newcomb wrote to Clark.  He added 
                                               
151Francis Bernard, Heitman,  Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States 
Army, from its Organization, September 29, 1789, to March 2, 1903 Vol. 1 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1965), 304.  
152 IC to TJ February 7, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607.  
153 Fort Brooke was the depot for all supplies entering Florida through Tampa.  The post 
was build less than five miles from the docks of the small city.  
154 IC to TJ April 11, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607; Francis Newcomb (FN) to TJ April 
25. 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607. 
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in a postscript a few days later, “send me a large vessel loaded with corn and hay as 
there will be quite a number of horses that must remain at this post.”155  Clark was able 
to accommodate Newcomb with the vessel, however the Major made it clear that he was 
constrained from future purchases by both lack of initiative on the part of senior officers, 
and inability to find ships. Clark wrote that he did not feel compelled to fulfill the orders 
of junior officers, and that he would only comply with orders from senior staff. 156 Of the 
ships, he simply wrote “they shall go when I find them.”157  In a separate letter to 
General Jesup, Newcomb made his own opinions on the matter known, placing the 
failures of the entire campaign on the shoulders of the Major. Newcomb wrote, “I regret 
that Maj. Clark did not send me horses and waggons to meet the army here as it would 
have destroyed the probability of a shadow in the mind of anyone, that a different end 
could have been attained.”158 While Newcomb may have been assigning undue blame to 
Clark for the failure of the war’s early campaigns, an outcome that is more correctly 
assigned to an over-reliance on horsepower, clearly, friction between the two officers 
impaired consistent supply of Fort Brooke. The issues experienced during the first 
months of the war along the eastern and western arteries of supply serve to demonstrate 
the pressure Quartermasters felt coordinating supplies with little instruction from senior 
officers, and even less reliable access to modes of transportation.   
                                               
155  FN to IC March 30, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607.  
156 IC to TJ April 20, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607.  
157IC to TJ April 20, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607.  
158FN to TJ April 11, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607.  
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Poor communication remained a staple in all campaigns within the Florida War, 
but the proliferation of chartered ships, expanded purchasing authority, and funds to 
make purchases solidified the fragmented supply arteries.  As news circulated of Scott’s 
and Gaines’ combined failures in Florida, the prices for forage, ships, and rations rose 
exorbitantly.  To civilian merchants, the Quartermaster Department, and a President in 
desperate need of a competent commander, the Second Seminole War was becoming a 
bigger “business” daily.159    
 
CREDIT AND COMMAND: RICHARD KEITH CALL’S CAMPAIGN, FALL 
1836  
 During the summer of 1836 Florida Governor Richard Keith Call received 
orders from an old political ally, President Jackson, to establish a plan to end the war in 
Florida.  Following Scott and Gaines’s dismissal from operations, command in Florida 
was, by rank, to pass to either Generals Duncan Lamont Clinch, or Abraham Eustice.  
The generals, both elderly veterans of the War of 1812, retired from service in response.  
Command fell next to Quartermaster General Thomas Sidney Jesup, who promptly 
declined and was rewarded with a spiteful order to command operations against Creeks 
in Alabama. President Jackson, received a letter from Richard Keith Call asking for 
command.160 Hoping for a quick victorious campaign that following fall, and furious 
with his senior officers, the President agreed to the unconventional arrangement.   
                                               
159 MC to TJ January 5, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 601. 
160 AJ to TJ, May 20, 1836, LOC TS Jesup Papers General Correspondence 1780-1907, 
Box 6, 1836-1838; RKC to AJ  May 8, 1836 NARA, RG 92, Box 605.  
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Throughout the summer of 1836, Call drew up an ambitious military strategy, 
reliant on thousands of mounted militia and an unrealistically large supply network to 
keep them fed.  His plan called for 2,000 horses, forage to feed them for six months, and 
two thousand volunteers to ride them.161 Such a host would require over seven million 
pounds of forage in order to stay fed.  The army would muster at Tampa and Fort Drane 
then use a large two-pronged pincer movement to envelop the static Seminoles in central 
Florida. There, at the supposed Seminole stronghold in the Cove of Withlacoochee 
River, a decisive cavalry battle would end the conflict.162  Perhaps it was Call’s lack of 
formal officer training, or maybe it was the staggering heat of the Florida summer, but 
whatever the case, Call’s grand cavalry strategy neglected two key logistical factors:  
availability of supply and timing. 
Call’s plan for supplying his mounted forces was easily the most ambitious 
logistical undertaking seen in the early half of the war.  In a letter to Andrew Jackson, 
and a later more detailed plan sent to Thomas Sidney Jesup, Call described his proposed 
supply lines.  He began his letter to Jackson by acknowledging the state of supplies in 
Florida in June 1836, writing that the large stores in Tampa under the charge of Lt. 
Newcomb were “almost spoiled, and the hay I am told, is laying in heaps exposed to the 
weather.”163 Call dismissed the timely use of these stores since the hay would be 
“entirely lost before it can be consumed.”164  Instead, a completely new supply of forage, 
                                               
161RKC to AJ, June 3, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 605.  
162RKC to AJ, June 3, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 605; RKC to TJ, September 8, 1836, 
NARA, RG 92, Box 605 
163 RKC to AJ, June 3, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 605.  
164 RKC to AJ, June 3, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 605.  
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double the amount of horses, and new calls for volunteers were required.165  Call 
disliked the sluggish nature of Winfield Scott’s march against the Seminoles. To avoid a 
repeat of his predecessors’ mistakes, Call suggested using only pack horses for carrying 
supplies and a tight network of depots scattered throughout the interior to keep his 
armies mobile and fed.166 Call’s proposed placement of the forts was reasonable; he 
suggested three large depots in the interior of Florida between Fort Brooke and Garrey’s 
Ferry, all along rivers navigable by steamboat.  The most critical of these was the post at 
Volusia, along the southern bend of the St. Johns River, just south of Lake George.  
From there, Call’s troops could move southwest toward his second army in Tampa.  By 
avoiding the roads used by Scott, Call hoped to preserve the element of surprise while 
catching the Seminoles in the middle.167 The Governor's plan was original, daring, and—
more importantly to Jackson—completely different from both Scott and Gaines’s 
attempts at pacifying the Seminoles.  However, Call was neither a strategist, nor 
logistician.  
Call’s plan suffered from two major logistical setbacks before it could be 
executed.  His letter to Jesup on September 8, 1836 was the first detailed document the 
commander penned outlining the actual specifics of his plan.   The Governor was 
frequently sick throughout the summer and as a result had only made broad claims to 
Jackson and Jesup about his fall campaign. By the time he recovered his health and the 
                                               
165 RKC to AJ, June 3, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 605; RKC to TJ, September 8, 1836, 
NARA, RG 92, Box 605. 
166 RKC to TJ, September 8, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 605. 
167 RKC to TJ, September 8, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 605. 
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weather cooled, the time had come and gone for orders to go out establishing his 
network of depots in the interior.168  Call was forced to wait for word from Washington 
of Jesup’s and the Quartermaster Department’s approval of campaign.  By time proper 
coordination was established between Call, Jesup, and the War Department it was late 
September. The Governor had precious few months to accomplish his logistical and 
military goals before the weather turned rainy in winter.169  To Call’s credit, he 
recognized the importance of streamlining the unwieldy authorization process for 
Quartermaster purchases that bogged down Scott’s campaign.  He issued an order with 
his supply requests allowing Quartermasters autonomy to purchase horses and supplies 
at will.170  Despite speeding up the acquisition process, when Call was ready to begin 
mobilizing forces for the campaign in Tallahassee, the majority of his proposed supply 
depots were either not constructed or empty. There were simply not enough horses, 
wagons, and labor crews in the territory to build his depot network—much less keep it 
supplied in readiness for two fully mounted armies.171   
The two major supply lines met with mixed success in outfitting Call’s grand 
horse-borne assault into the Florida interior.  Operating under new the authority and 
autonomy granted by Call, eastern Quartermasters were able to freely purchase any and 
all supplies they individually saw as useful for the campaign.  Needing only to write to 
                                               
168JL to TC January 19, 1837, NARA, RG 92, Box 604. 
169 CC to TC October 24, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603.   
170RKC to TJ, September 8, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 605; MC to TC October 12, 
1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603; RKC to Lt. Col. Pierce, October 18, 1836, NARA, RG 
92, Box 603.  
171MC to TC October 12, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603; JL to TC January 19, 1837, 
NARA, RG 92, Box 604. 
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Washington City to report their expenses or request more credit, eastern Quartermasters 
flooded depots at Garrey’s Ferry and St. Augustine with horses, forage, and gear.172  
Local markets and steamboat captains eagerly raised prices to capitalize on the 
redoubled purchasing efforts of Quartermasters in the east.  In the west, New Orleans 
remained a difficult place to find boats in.173  While most of Call’s requests were filled, 
his eagerness to commence his campaign in late September of 1836 left the majority of 
his forage and horses in transit.  Thus, most of the mounted units utilized by Call’s plan 
left Tallahassee marching, not riding.174  The Quartermasters’ newfound autonomy to 
make purchases, combined with Call’s impatient demands for horses and forage, led to 
constant requests for more funds in all the major supply points along the arteries. This 
drove both the local and federal costs for the Florida war to heights thought 
unfathomable at the outset of hostilities six months earlier.  
Lt. John L’Engle, a twenty-five year old junior officer in Charleston, played a 
central role in facilitating Call’s campaign, providing both the horses, and the boats to 
carry them, in the first weeks of October 1836.  L’Engle’s returns reveal how drastic the 
escalation in procurement was to supply Call’s campaign.  On September 3, L’Engle 
requested an allowance of $81,000 to cover expenses from Scott’s campaign and 
“furnish a large supply of forage, 60 horses, twelve wagons” and other horse-related gear 
                                               
172Horses Sent to Garry’s Ferry By Lt. John L’Engle Aug 9- Nov3 1836, NARA, RG 92, 
Box 604; JL to TC January 19, 1837. NARA, RG 92, Box 604; Requisitions from Lt. 
C.O. Collins and times sent to Florida November 13, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604. 
173 RKC to TJ, September 8, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 605. 
174 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 181.  
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for St. Augustine.175  Two weeks later he informed a civilian agent in Jacksonville that 
“Genl Call required me to deposit at Jacksonville 75,000 Rations and forage for 2,000 
horses for 30 days, you are required to have suitable store houses in readiness for their 
reception.”176  On September 28 L’Engle requested an additional $50,000.  He added, 
“be prepared to remit as much more in a short time hence.”177  Within a month L’Engle 
reported the successful shipment of 402 horses and 71 mules via ten chartered schooners 
and steamers to Jacksonville.178  He predicted that replacements and supplies for the 
2,000 horses in Florida would not slacken and requested that he be granted $50,000 a 
month.  L’Engle explained that much of the funds asked for would “meet demands that I 
know will shortly be made on me for charter of vessels and steamboats.”179  L’Engle’s 
ability to act with authorized autonomy under Call’s command was crucial to ensuring 
both the desired speed and quantity of supplies heading south by boat.  However, as the 
months mounted so too did the staggering costs for transport, labor, and storage.  By 
November L'Engle was responsible for roughly $181,000 in credit to dozens of horse 
salesmen, local merchants, and ship charters.180  As a major eastern supply node, 
Charleston was able to support the demands of Call’s cavalry campaign. Further to the 
south, the egregious nature of the Governor's campaign requisitions were more apparent.  
                                               
175 JL to TC, September 3, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.  
176 JL to L. N. Mitchell, September 16, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604. 
177 JL to TC, September 28, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604. 
178 Horses sent to Garry’s Ferry by John L’Engle Aug 9-Nov 3 1836, NARA, RG 92, 
Box 604.  
179 JL to TC, November 20, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.  
180 ANALYSIS of the Expenditures made by the Quartermaster's Department at several 
Military Posts &c, in the First Quarter of the year 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 498.; 
L’Engle’s $181,000 would be roughly equivalent to $3.9 million in 2017.  
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Savannah’s proximity to the distribution points in northern Florida provided a 
unique perspective into problems with funds for procurement of horses and forage to 
Call’s Campaign.  Lt. Charles O. Collins was the Quartermaster in Savannah for the 
massive buildup of forces and supplies.  Like L’Engle, Collins was ordered in early 
October to aid in the procurement of hundreds of horses and forage to feed them.181  
Also like his northern counterpart, Collins immediately requested his credit be extended 
to $50,000, writing that “no exertion shall be spared in my part to supply the wants of 
the army.”182  The next day Collins sent a second letter to Washington City. “He has 
requested of me 400 horses, 100 mules, 300 saddles bridles and saddlebags and forage, 
these are the principal things I think thirty thousand dollars in additional to that asked for 
yesterday is necessary” the Lieutenant commented.183  Collins quickly realized that even 
the dramatic expansion of his line of credit was not enough to fill logistical 
requirements. Call’s requests and the local market prices pressed Collins into a situation 
of constant buying with little regard for expense.  He wrote a week later, “I am 
somewhat embarrassed now for want of funds! I have purchased more horses than I can 
pay for, but I am in hopes the bank will accommodate me until money is received.  I fear 
more horses will be wanted.  In that case, more than the eighty thousand that I have 
asked for will be required.”184  Collins’s exasperation quickly turned to skepticism as he 
received news of Call’s progress over the next two months. 
                                               
181  CC to TC October 24, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603.  
182 CC to TC October 24, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603.  
183 CC to TC October 25 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603; Requisitions of MM Clark & 
Col. Pierce from Savannah Fall 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603. 
184 CC to TC November 1, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603.  
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  Collins’s reports to Washington City reflected a key problem with the supply 
system setup under the Governor's command--it worked well, but not on Call’s timeline. 
By early November Call’s horse-borne force marched south through the interior of 
Florida toward the Withlacoochee River and the Seminole stronghold at Wahoo Swamp.  
The troops carried less than a month of feed and rations.  His supply network in the 
interior was empty, and the majority of horses and forage sent in the October purchasing 
frenzy were still in transit. “He has not waited for his supplies, those supplies indeed 
which ought to have been there in September or sooner, should have been there before, 
[had] the Gov made a timely requisition,” Collins reflected. “The vast number of horses 
required, is, as far as my knowledge goes, extravagantly useless- but I am only to obey 
orders.”185  Throughout October and November 1836 Collins and L’Engle sent over 
1,000 horses south.186  By late November news reached Collins of Call’s failure to 
destroy the Seminoles at Wahoo Swamp.  Stymied by two river crossings, his troops 
starving, Call ordered his force to withdraw east to Volusia where he expected rations 
and forage in readiness.  Collins, having read dispatches sent north to Washington knew 
the truth of the matter.  Call repeated the mistakes of his first venture south from Fort 
Drane in October. “There are no provisions at Volusia and if Gov. Call falls upon that 
place within three or four days, he will find himself in the same predicament as his last 
attempt,” Collins wrote acting Quartermaster General Thomas Cross.187  Collins 
                                               
185 CC to TC November 10, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603.  
186 Requisitions from Lt. CO Collins and times sent to Florida Nov 13, 1836, NARA, RG 
92, Box 603.   
187 Doherty, Richard Keith Call, 103-109; CC to TC November 21, 1836, NARA, RG 
92, Box 603. 
 66 
 
 
explained, “there are enough supplies in Florida to last the army six months,” but none 
of it had arrived in Volusia.188  The supplies Call needed were stored in depots at 
Garrey’s Ferry, also known as Fort Heilman.  The experiences of Lt. Michael Clark, 
stationed there, sheds further light on the problems of distribution. 
 Shipping by boat from Charleston and Savannah ensured supplies could get to 
Florida in mass, but distribution of these supplies from Garrey’s Ferry remained a 
critical problem in October and November of 1836.189  Lt. Clark was reassigned to the 
depot of Garrey’s Ferry after the abandonment of Fort Drane in the summer between 
Scott and Call’s campaigns.   Upon receiving his orders to facilitate the supply of Call’s 
campaign in October, Clark understood the futility of the demands.  He observed, “I 
have been in the habit of anticipating all demands that might be made on me as much as 
possible; but I could not foresee everything.  I conceive that I should have received 
orders, some ten or twelve weeks before the campaign was to be opened.”190  Clark, 
unable to make any purchases from the surrounding area, was forced to simply wait for 
the arrival of Collins’s and L’Engle’s shipments.  As Call grew impatient, fearing the 
Seminoles might slip away, he ordered his forces to march from Tallahassee. Clark was 
well aware of how few supplies the army had received before it left. He wrote to 
                                               
188 CC to TC November 21, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603; Collins also requested an 
additional $50,000 at this later date in the campaign bringing his total requested funds to 
$210,000 for Savannah alone within October and November 1836 (a sum equivalent to 
4.5 million dollars in 2017).  
189 Garrey’s Ferry, lay roughly 30 miles south of Jacksonville along Black Creek, a 
navigable tributary of the St. John’s River.  Today it has been subsumed by the 
Jacksonville metropolitan area; Mahon, Second Seminole War, 151, 175-178.   
190 MC to TJ, October 12, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603. 
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Washington City that only “about sixty of the horses & mules purchased for the 
expedition have arrived…No person here has as yet been able to conjecture what can be 
the cause of this sudden movement without waiting for the horses which were a few days 
since considered as being absolutely necessary.”191 Clark received the remainder of the 
horses a week later. By then it was too late.  Call’s forces commenced their march and 
Garrey’s Ferry was left inundated with horses and forage.   
 Clark attempted to fulfill Call’s vision of a network of supply points to the best 
of his ability, but as Volusia became the critical point in need of supply, distance and 
hostile action were a major hindrance.  Clark was in a paradoxical position as the 
Quartermaster of Garrey’s Ferry.  His proximity to Call’s campaign granted him fast, 
accurate intelligence on the status of Call’s forces withdrawing from their defeat at 
Wahoo Swamp to Volusia in November.  However, few steamboats could divert from 
their charters to and from Charleston to Florida and travel further south down the river to 
Volusia.192  Clark was forced to rely on wagons sent along narrow foot trails that ran 
parallel with the river, in hopes supplies could reach the southern depot before Call 
did.193 Clark wrote of his frustration finding wagons and teams to drive them.  The 
majority of wagons at Gerrey’s Ferry were too big for the broken and wasting horses at 
the depot to haul, and he could only find “but about 10 men to drive wagons.”194  
Hesitation among drivers stemmed from the increased ambushes along the St. Johns 
                                               
191 MC to TC, November 5, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603. 
192 MC to TC, November 23, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603. 
193 MC to TC, November 19, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603; MC to TC November 23, 
1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603.  
194 MC to TC, November 19, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603.  
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River.  Dozens of soldiers, pro-American Creek allies, and wagons were captured in the 
weeks of desperate attempts to supply Volusia.195 Despite problems with boats, wagons, 
and ambushes, Clark reported that he successfully supplied 45,000 rations for men and 
26,000 rations of hay for horses to the beleaguered army by December 2, 1836.196   
 Despite Call’s plan highlighting the western artery of supply as critical for 
resupply of his army, Maj. Isaac Clark again failed to produce supplies in a timely 
fashion.  On October 16, Clark received an extensive list of requests from General 
Thomas Jesup. President Jackson ordered the Quartermaster General to assume 
command of Call’s second army in Tampa Bay. Clark again balked at the expectations 
placed upon him.197  He wrote to Thomas Cross in Washington City that “the Genl must 
have a very exalted opinion of my powers to perform all the services of this 
department.”198 Clark asked for a $100,000 extension to his credit, but followed his 
initial request with a much longer complaint. He argued that he lacked funds, time, and 
boats in the port to meet Jesup’s requests. He ended his report with an ultimatum: 
“Please send me funds and at least five assistant qr masters, or I must be relieved.”199 
The frustrated Major was either unaware of Call’s order granting Quartermasters 
authority to purchase at will, or was using the supply of Jesup’s army as leverage to 
acquire and foist work on junior officer “assistants.”  The latter seems a more reasonable 
                                               
195MC to TC, November 19, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603; MC to TC November 23, 
1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603; MC to TC December 2, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603.  
196 MC to TC, December 2, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603. 
197 TJ to IC, October 16 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.  
198 IC to TC October 29, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.  
199 IC to TC October 29, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.  
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explanation as Quartermaster work was considered beneath more senior officers.200 
Clark’s incompetence went unpunished and largely unnoticed by the Quartermaster’s 
Department as Call’s starving army garnered more funds and attention.  The failures at 
New Orleans serves to showcase the effectiveness of the junior officers in the east 
managing funds, supplies, and shipping without assistants or even ranking supervision.  
In the months following Call’s failed campaign, the Governor attempted to shift 
blame away from himself and onto the Quartermaster Department for the supply 
shortages of his army.  More specifically, he targeted Lt. John L’Engle operating in 
Charleston.201  Call alleged that he could not complete the campaign because L’Engle 
failed to fulfill his orders for the supply of the 2,000 horses and forage required to feed 
them. Call accused L’Engle of being “one of many officers who were unwilling to 
acknowledge [my] authority to command them and were determined to throw every 
embarrassment in [my] way.”202  L’Engle submitted several signed testimonies from 
Charleston and the manifests of the seven boats he chartered to demonstrate that he 
successfully shipped over half a million pounds of forage to Florida from September to 
November 1836.203 When unable to send supplies in late October due to cholera in the 
city, L’Enlge coordinated with Collins in Savannah to see that shipments were 
fulfilled.204 L’Engle’s evidence, paired with returns sent to Washington City throughout 
                                               
200WF to IC Nov. 9 1836. NARA, RG 92, Box 603; Watson, Peacekeepers, 455.  
201 JL to TC January 19, 1837, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.  
202 JL to TC January 19, 1837, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.  
203 L’Engle shipping manifests/complaining of ships in early 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 
603.; JL to TJ, January 28, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604. 
204 L’Engle shipping manifests/complaining of ships in early 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 
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Call’s campaign, suggests that if there was anyone to blame for the failure in the fall of 
1836, it was Call himself. 
 
CONCLUSION 
If the first three campaigns of the Second Seminole War proved anything to 
leaders in Washington City, it was that poor leadership, reliance on horse-borne 
campaigns, and logistics were intimately intertwined and at the root of the repeated 
failures. After coldly relieving Call from command, Jackson turned over control of the 
massively expensive conflict to General Thomas Sidney Jesup, the former Quartermaster 
General of the army.205  Jesup assumed command of a tightly knit eastern supply line 
with competent officers willing to act under orders and with initiative to see requests 
fulfilled.  The western artery remained problematic, as Isaac Clark was neither relieved, 
nor did he receive his five assistants.  He remained Quartermaster in New Orleans until 
his death in 1842.206  Jesup’s next two campaigns against the Seminoles benefited from 
additional Congressional appropriations and bills that granted the federal payment of 
claims made by militia and civilians for horses purchased by the army.207 This new 
freedom gave Quartermasters both in Florida and in neighboring states further 
                                               
205 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 191-193. 
206Heitman, Register, 304.; ANALYSIS of the Expenditures made by the Quarter 
Master’s Department at several Military Posts &c, in the Second Quarter of the year 
1842, NARA, RG 92, Box 498.  
207 War Department Circular on Payment of Claims, January 18, 1837, NARA, RG 92, 
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opportunities to procure animals and supplies.  One of the unforeseen consequences of 
such freedom was the potential for corruption.  
Plagued by poor communication and localized troubles with markets, the supply 
lines flowing into the Florida War grew in fits and bursts. The major stimulant that 
allowed the disjointed lines to strengthen into a more effective delivery system was the 
near-impunity Quartermasters experienced in spending and extending their lines of 
credit under Call’s command.  Lack of cash, or reaching credit limits with local banks 
occasionally prevented Quartermasters from making purchases.208   However, more 
often than not Quartermasters had access to a nearly unlimited line of credit, and after 
Call’s Campaign, they possessed the authority to use it with little repercussion. The 
precedent to “spare no exertion in the supply of the army,” particularly among the 
eastern Quartermasters, held for the remainder of the war.209 Corruption was a costly 
consequence. Thousands of fraudulent claims and one major court martial of a ranking 
Quartermaster proved that not every purchase was made with the public good in mind.   
This chapter has been the first study of the logistics behind the extravagant 
expense of the Second Seminole War. The campaigns of Gaines, Scott, and Call help 
illustrate much of the early funding and supply infrastructure, and work toward fully 
answering Mahon’s call for an understanding of this aspect of the conflict.  In order to 
                                               
208Col. K. L. Baldwin to TJ, October 18, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 601; CC to TC, 
November 1, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604; RKC to TC December 11, 1837, NARAN, 
RG 92, Box 603.  
209ANALYSIS of the Expenditures made by the Quarter Master’s Department at several 
Military Posts &c, RG 92, Box 498. These ledgers provide names and itemized 
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trend for the Eastern supply line to spend more than west remained consistent after 1836.  
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fully explain the logistical costs of the war, it is necessary to explore another 
understudied aspect of the conflict, the degree to which Quartermasters utilized much of 
their freedom to spend for their personal benefit.   The next chapter will explore the way 
in which corruption, fraud, and abuse of authority added to the drastically escalating 
expense of the Second Seminole War.  
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CHAPTER IV  
“IN DISREGARD OF THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES”: 
PROFITEERING AND FRAUD, THE CASE OF LT. COL. JOSHUA B. BRANT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 It was June in St. Louis, when a group of men dressed in their powder blue 
uniforms and officer’s regalia sat in a small stifling courtroom commandeered to serve 
their purposes.210  Before them sat accused and accuser, both officers of the United 
States Army, both trained as Quartermasters.  Captain William Hart, the Judge 
Advocate, stood and commenced the proceedings, reading the charges brought against 
the accused:  Fraud against the United States Government with fourteen specifications, 
Violation of Official Trust and Neglect of Duty on seven specifications, and Conduct 
Unbecoming of an Officer and a Gentleman on two specifications.211  The accused had 
allegedly embezzled nearly five times the annual salary of a field-grade officer, some 
$6,104, in only nine months’ time.212  Lt. Col. Joshua Brant was no doubt unsurprised by 
the charges brought against him. He and his accuser, Maj. George H. Crosman, had been 
                                               
210 Proceedings of a General Court Martial in the Case of Lieutenant Colonel Joshua B. 
Brant Deputy Qr. Master General (Brant CTM.) NARA, RG 153, CC-437A, Box 105, 1-
4.   
211 Charges in a Court-marital identified which article of war the solider had violated, 
specifications explained the details of criminal act committed; Henry Coppee, Field 
Manual of Courts-martial, Containing the Forms and Proceeding, of All Kinds of 
Courts-marital, and an Explanation of the Duties of all Persons Connected with Military 
Tribunals, In Any Capacity (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1863), 19-20; Brant CTM, 
NARA, RG 153, CC-437A, Box 105, Appendix A, 1-25.  
212 $6,104 in 1837 translates to $131,785.36 in 2017, however this is only what Brant 
was accused of for the year of 1837, in reality the number may be much higher.  
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engaged in legal battle for the past six months in a military Court of Inquiry 
investigating the actions taken by Brant during the summer of 1837.  The Court Martial 
that began on June 15, 1839 was merely the next step in assessing the allegations 
Crosman brought against Brant.  The case took another six months and over a thousand 
pages of written testimony to conclude, but Crosman’s investigations, Brant’s schemes, 
and the proceedings of the court case provide new insights into gross government 
overspending during the Second Seminole War, and those who sought to exploit the 
opportunity.   
 Scholarship of military corruption within the Quartermaster’s Department during 
the nineteenth-century, particularly the antebellum era, does not exist in any real form.  
While several scholars have tackled civilian profiteering off of Jacksonian Indian 
Removal policies, particularly during Creek and Cherokee removal, there has been little 
exploration into military cases of fraud.213  As a result, the majority of the already scant 
scholarship regarding nineteenth-century military logistics remains focused principally 
on European conflict and the transportation of supplies during the American Civil 
War.214  Investigations into the development of the professionalized American officer 
                                               
213Haveman, Rivers of Sand; Young, Redskins, Ruffleshirts, and Rednecks; Ellisor, The 
Second Creek War. 
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corps during the antebellum period offer some useful insight into how officers 
interpreted the Panic of 1837 and the effect it had on their career prospects.  William 
Skeleton identified an unprecedented spike in resignations from the officer corps in 
1837, but does not comment on other, less than legal, ways officers may have 
circumvented their low pay in the years immediately following the panic.  Finally, the 
few histories that touch on the antebellum Quartermaster's Department in this era focus 
their analysis strictly on the Florida War with its major employment of wagons and 
expenses therein.215  None have cast their lenses west to include the historic French fur 
trading town of St. Louis as a critical site in the supply and exploitation of the war effort.  
This chapter seeks to address these historiographical gaps by investigating the Case of 
Joshua Brant and his place within the larger context of American Quartermasters, Indian 
Removal, and supplying the antebellum army.  
 St. Louis’s proximity to the Mississippi River and its remoteness from eastern 
cities and infrastructure provided an excellent location to perpetuate mass fraud during 
the Second Seminole War.  By 1837, the Quartermaster Department was actively 
purchasing goods and supplies, namely forage, horses, and wagons, from nearly every 
major city in the United States.  Quartermasters in cities along the Eastern Seaboard and 
                                               
Logistics: A Study of Military Transportation (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: State University 
Press, 2017), 5-16.  
215 The scant literature that addresses Second Seminole War Logistics devotes no more 
than 1 to 4 pages to the conflict. See: Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, 181-
233; Waddell, United States Army Logistics, 41-45. 
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the Mississippi River were especially heavy spenders.216 Due to the disproportionately 
large demands for cash and credit in cities like Savannah, Charleston, and New Orleans, 
the Treasury Department quickly involved itself in investigating fraudulent claims made 
by civilians against the Government.  The Treasury Department rarely investigated 
Quartermasters given that few had personal ties to the cities they were stationed in. 
While the Army Quartermaster returns were often substantially larger than civilian 
claims, the sheer volume of civilian and militia claim inundated the Third Auditor of the  
Treasury’s office until well after the war ended.217 With the constant demand for 
supplies in Florida, the relatively low rank of Quartermasters, and official scrutiny on 
ledger books, it seemed unlikely that southeastern Quartermasters would have the time, 
rank, or skill to execute a successful fraud scheme. However, for a higher ranking 
Quartermaster hundreds of miles from Florida and Treasury Department auditors, 
stationed in his hometown of over ten years, circumstances and opportunities were much 
different.218  St. Louis was not a large city compared to its eastern counterparts, but its 
location made it a necessary purchasing point for supplies for both ends of Indian 
                                               
216 MC to TC, October 12, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 602; CC to TC, October 24, 1836, 
NARA, RG 92, Box 603; Requisitions of MM Clark and Col. Pierce from Savannah, 
October 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604. 
217 The Third Auditor of the Treasury, Peter Hagner and his staff, became involved with 
investigating claims made against the government in 1837 and was still reimbursing or 
denying claims as late as 1851.  Much of this was due to incomplete paper work, the 
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came from all over the Southeast to serve in Florida. Much of the Third Auditor’s 
paperwork is intermixed with the consolidated correspondence of the Quartermaster 
General, NARA, RG 92, Boxes 601-607.  
218 Lieut. Col. Joshua B. Brant Deputy Quartermaster General Proceedings of the Court 
of Inquiry in his case held at St. Louis, MO. Pursuant to General Orders No. 43. Of 
1838. C. (Brant CTI), NARA, RG 153, CC-433½ , Box 105, 4-6.  
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removal.219  Quartermasters stationed there were responsible for acquiring horses, camp 
supplies, feed, and rations for the Army and removed persons alike; they shipped 
supplies west to Oklahoma and south to New Orleans to be ferried to Florida.220 This 
positioning at the midpoint of the removal operations granted Quartermasters in St. 
Louis nearly the same freedom of spending as their Southeastern counterparts, but with 
significantly less supervision.  
When taken against the larger backdrop of massive government financial waste 
during the Second Seminole War, the economic recession in 1837, and small size of the 
officer corps, the ease with which a well-connected and determined officer could 
perpetuate a large-scale fraud increased precipitously the further from the Southeast said 
officer went.  As Quartermasters in the Southeast received more and more autonomy and 
authority following Richard Keith Call’s disastrous campaign, the pattern carried forth to 
peripheral cities like St. Louis where Lt. Col. Joshua Brant, then a Major, used personal 
ties, unsupervised credit, and rank to establish and perpetuate several highly successful 
fraud schemes against the federal government, embezzling nearly five  times his annual 
salary in nine months.   
 
                                               
219 St. Louis grew in population from roughly 6,000 to 16,000 between 1830-1840. St. 
Louis City Plan Commission- 1969, “Physical Growth of the City of Saint Louis” 
Https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/archive/history-physical-growth-stlouis/#boom.  
220 IC to TJ, February 7, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607; IC to TJ, February 7, 1836, 
NARA, RG 92, Box 607.; Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½ , Box 105, 17-21, 37, 
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AN INCONSPICUOUS NETWORK: CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR 
EXPLOITATION IN ST. LOUIS 
 In 1837, St. Louis remained an important juncture for the shipment of 
government supplies despite the economic issues brewing in the east. While Jackson’s 
“pet banks” collapsed and credit ballooned in the east, the growing riverside city was 
lively with economic interactions.221  Steamboats stopped along the city’s many docks 
night and day. Dozens of brick store houses sprung up along the riverside to 
accommodate the large amount of crops and lumber shipped south from newly 
established towns in Illinois.  Livery stables made handsome profits buying horses from 
rural breeders and selling them downriver both to support the war effort and to private 
buyers.222  Amidst the bustle of daily transactions, Major Joshua Brant was tasked with 
supplying everything from horses for Dragoon regiments, to tents for removed 
Southeastern Indigenous peoples. The small city was an important purchasing point for 
horses along the western supply artery going into the Florida War, and while Brant did 
not report his activities as frequently as his Southeastern counterparts, his ledger books 
show a wide scope of responsibilities, most of which were legal.223  
   Maj. Joshua Brant lived in St. Louis from 1830 to his death in 1861.  
Considering his twenty-four year long tenure in the Quartermaster Department and 
knowledge of the region, he was clearly the best man for the job of Deputy 
                                               
221 William J. Petersen, Steamboating on the Upper Mississippi, (Iowa City, Iowa: State 
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222 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½ , Box 105, 152, 166-168, 187, 249.   
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Quartermaster General in the city.224  His 1838 letter of defense during the Court of 
Inquiry into his actions laid out many of his achievements and skills as Quartermaster.  
Enlisting in the army in 1812, Brant saw action on the Niagara Campaign, and received a 
brevet to the rank of 1st Lieutenant.225 After the war Brant was given the assignment of 
Quartermaster, a task he found particularly fitting for his skills.  He wrote, “while 
serving in the Quarter Master’s Department I have often been called upon to perform 
extra arduous, and highly important services.”  He listed his disbursement of claims 
during the “Winnebago Disturbances” in 1827, aiding in supplying General Atkinson 
during the Black Hawk War in Wisconsin Territory in 1832, and serving as liaison 
between Alabama militia units and pro-American Creeks during Creek removal in 
1836.226  In all, Brant claimed he had disbursed “more than 2 ½ millions of dollars: the 
whole of which amount has been truly accounted for without deflation or loss.”227 Brant 
was unique in his pride of the station; most officers of similar rank like Maj. Isaac 
Clarke in New Orleans, or Col. William Foster, shunned the duty.  These officers often 
sought opportunities to foist the tedious work of ledgers and receipts onto younger 
officers.228  Brant, however, enjoyed his station and responsibilities in Missouri.  His 
rank of Major made him the highest ranking officer in the small city, giving him near 
                                               
224 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 4. 
225 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 3-6. 
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impunity over his small staff of clerks and subordinates.229  His station and rank also 
came with job security, allowing him to purchase a considerable plot of land just outside 
St. Louis where he maintained horse pastures and a small acreage of corn.230 Finally, the 
position let him remain close to his family, friends, and most importantly, business 
associates who aided him in a series of “petty speculations...so trivial in their aggregate 
amount as not to present the slightest temptation to any man of independent pecuniary 
means.”231  Brant’s training, rank, personal property, and local ties all contributed to his 
complete control of Quartermaster functions in the city of St. Louis and allowed him to 
create several successful instances of fraud against the federal government.    
Over the course of the seven years Brant lived in St. Louis he actively established 
an infrastructure of business ties and property ownership that aided his later schemes 
against the federal government.   From purchasing store houses under false names, to 
opening bank accounts under the names of his associates, Brant was able to manipulate 
his knowledge of the city and the funds at his discretion as a Quartermaster to create his 
fraudulent networks.  Over the years of 1835-1838 Brant opened at least seven accounts 
for goods sold to the United States Government in the names of his associates.  On 
Brant’s ledgers, John Darnielle, and William Dowler, sold horses, canoes, and camp 
goods, to the government. The real Darnielle and Dowler had no knowledge of such 
transactions.232 In July 1830, Brant signed a deed to two connected store houses with an 
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associate named John Goodfellow and his wife on the corner of Second and Laurel 
streets for $600.233  The storehouses, one brick, one wood, were less than a city block 
away from the river, but several blocks from the established steamboat docks, further to 
the south.234  While it is conceivable that Brant and Goodfellow initially purchased these 
buildings for legitimate business purposes in 1830, the ledgers of Brant’s purchases as 
Quartermaster in the city from 1829-1838 demonstrate these store houses were 
frequently used for government storage.235  By 1835, Brant presided over a small 
network of associates, accounts, and properties, all that he needed was permission from 
the government to increase his budget and spending.  That opportunity came with the 
drastic escalation in national spending following Winfield Scott and Richard Keith 
Call’s campaigns against the Seminoles in 1836.  
Between the years of 1835 and 1839 Brant fulfilled his Quartermaster roles in 
three states and presided over the purchase, transport, and disbursement of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars’ worth of animals and goods.  In May of 1835, Brant abruptly began 
renting his storehouses to a V. W. Shepard.236 Brant’s Quartermaster returns listed the 
building as a hired store house for an annual rent of $1,000 paid to Shepard.  It is not 
known if Shepard was a living associate of Brant or an alias, as Brant was the chief 
officer in charge of dispersing checks, but as 1836 and 1837 came and went the store 
                                               
233Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC-437A, Box 105, Appendix N.  
234 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433 ½ , Box 105,  8, 39, Appendix C 23-25; As of 
2017, The plot of land in question is on the northern end of Gateway Arch Park, 
underneath the Eads Bridge.  
235 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433 ½, Box 105,  737-739.  
236 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 17-18.  
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house was utilized in at least two major fraud schemes while collecting monthly rent 
checks from the federal government.237 During 1836 and 1837 Brant was given orders to 
travel to Montgomery, Alabama to outfit Volunteer units as well as supply Creeks 
working with the military with weapons and gear.238  During 1836, Brant traveled 
frequently between Missouri and Alabama while maintaining his business ties and 
infrastructure of fraudulent names and properties.239 While in Alabama, he used his rank 
to garner a large line of credit in Montgomery, over $110,000, for outfitting Alabama’s 
notorious mounted volunteer regiments, the same that nearly mutinied in Tampa in 
1836.240  He then received permission from acting Quartermaster General Thomas Cross 
to disburse payments for that line of credit upon his return to St. Louis.241  However, 
before he could incorporate this massive amount of credit into his already brewing 
schemes, he was ordered to Florida to cover for Quartermaster Col. Francis Lane, who in 
“fevered confusion” drove a saber through his eye.242  
Brant’s abrupt reassignment to Florida, from October 1837 to June 1838, left his 
network vulnerable when a replacement Quartermaster was assigned in St. Louis, 
                                               
237 V.W. Shepard did not attend court as a witness, nor provide testimony like the 
majority of Brant’s other aliases.  It is likely the name was simply made up and existed 
only on Government returns; Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 17-19. 
238 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 17.  
239 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 16-20; Joshua Brant (JB) to Thomas 
Cross (TC) June, 29, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 601; JB to TC September 29, NARA, 
RG 92, Box 601; Copy of Letter from JB to C.C. Clay, June 29, 1836, NARA, RG 92, 
Box 602.  
240 DN to TJ March 15, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607. 
241  JB to TC September, 29, NARA, RG 92, Box 601.  
242Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 4; Army and Navy Chronicle Vol III 
No. 3 July 21, 1836; Prince, Storm of Bullets, 61.  
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especially one with less than “friendly feelings” for the Major.243  While Brant was 
transitioning between Montgomery and Tampa, he returned home in May 1837, and 
received orders to supply the newly formed 2nd Dragoon Regiment with 150 horses for 
use in Florida that following year.244 Brant, perhaps seeing the exorbitant price of horses 
in the Southeast, sought to exploit the storage costs and prices for the animals. Hiring 
agents to make purchases, feed, and sell the Dragoon horses, Brant’s extended criminal 
network quickly came to the attention of his replacement Captain George H. Crosman.  
Crosman had been an Assistant Quartermaster since 1830 in various posts in the 
Midwest, and was assigned to St. Louis in 1837.245  While Brant made infrequent visits 
to the city throughout 1837, Crosman received full responsibility as Deputy 
Quartermaster General.  Within weeks of assuming the position he was alerted by 
friends, fellow-officers, and local gossip, to the peculiar activities of his predecessor.  
The Dragoon horses were, in particular, “a commonplace topic of conversation in this 
city,” Crosman later testified.246  The Captain was not a friend of Brant’s. While his 
testimony fails to describe how the animosity developed between the two, he stated 
relations between “Major Brant and myself, although many years ago [were] friendly, 
for the last 3 or 4 years, have not been so.”247  Armed with potential leads, and the 
                                               
243Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 19  
244Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 125-130; Brant CTM, NARA, RG 
153, CC 437A , Box 105,  Appendix A.  
245 Heitman. Historical Register, 340.  
 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 56-58, 63. 
246Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 51.  
247 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 65-66.  
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personal disdain for the potentially corrupt Major, Capt. Crosman began making 
“diligent inquiries in as quiet a manner as possible.”248  
 
CROSMAN PULLS A THREAD: INVESTIGATION INTO BRANT’S SCHEMES 
 As Crosman began his investigation in 1837, his discoveries can be placed into 
three major groupings of schemes: horses, depots, and supplies.  The first grouping 
Crosman investigated was the purchase, sale, storage, and abuse of horses on Brant’s 
personal property just outside the city.  Between 100-200 horses, many bearing the brand 
“USD” for use with the newly created 2nd Dragoon Regiment in Florida, were stored 
and starved on his insufficient acreage of pasture land.249  The second set of schemes 
revolved around Brant’s ownership and rental of the two riverside depots. These 
storehouses emerged as an anomaly on Crosman’s ledgers due to their inconvenient 
placement and exorbitant rental pricing.  Finally, Crosman investigated a series of 
scattered allegations that Brant utilized the resettlement of Seminoles and Creeks to his 
profit, at the expense of fellow officers in the Office of Indian Affairs.  Combined, 
Crosman’s “diligent inquiries” served to established the foundation for the largest fraud-
related court martial the army witnessed during the Second Seminole War.250  
                                               
248 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 20. 
249 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 133. 
250 The author surveyed all Courts Martial the Army conducted between February 1836-
July 1842 within the territory Florida, in Washington, or related to the Florida War.  
Within these confines, 313 Courts Martials were served.  The case of Joshua Brant easily 
generated the largest amount of testimony, trumping even the more famous Court of 
Inquiry into the actions of Winfield Scott and his rival Edmund P. Gaines in 1836.  It 
should be also noted that this was the only recorded case of the 313 analyzed that 
charged a Quartermaster for fraud during the 7 years of the war. Records of the Judge 
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 Crosman’s investigations began first with inquiries into the purchase of Dragoon 
horses, rumored to have been made by agents hired by Brant.251  Crosman later testified 
that his first lead was his conversations with fellow officers and “gentlemen of high 
standing” who argued the actions bore “inequalities of Major Brant, as Quartermaster 
which are of a very serious character.  It appears that horses for the Dragoon Service 
were purchased with private notes.”252  One agent, John Darnielle, was instructed by 
Brant to “receive from him in payment of said notes, horses, or oxen, or negroes or 
anything else that I could bring down to St. Louis and make the money on.”253 The agent 
purchased 5 horses, 2 oxen, and 1 mule then “sold” them to the government.254 The sale 
overseen and approved by Brant, was recorded as two $500 notes in the Quartermaster’s 
ledger.  Crosman sought Darnielle’s explanation, believing the horse agent was a 
“respected” member of St. Louis society, and felt confident in his report that he was 
payed $50 for his services buying and reselling the horses to Brant.255  Crosman 
surmised that Brant had somehow induced Darneille to sign off on the sales of horses 
before marking a specific price for the animals.  This allowed Brant to purchase the 
animals at a much cheaper rate of $75, depositing the remaining money into a private 
                                               
Advocate General, Court Martial Case Files, NARA, RG 153, CC 143-DD 35, Box 86-
115.  
251 Crosman testified that he was alerted to Brant’s misconduct first by Col. E. L. Marsh. 
Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 66.  
252Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 25-27. 63-64. 
253 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 94.  
254 The animals were purchased from William Walker, a resident of Franklin Missouri. 
Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A; Brant CTI, NARA, RG 
153, CC 433 ½, Box 105, 25-26; 52. 
255 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 25-28.  
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account, and taking ownership of the oxen and mule without ever utilizing his private 
funds.256  Finally, Darnielle commented that Brant grew frustrated at his high purchasing 
prices because presumably Brant would not be able to deposit as much of the overhead 
as he anticipated.  Darnielle later testified, “I add too, if it be necessary, that I thought he 
mistreated me.”257  Yet, the purchases made by Darnielle were indicative of a much 
larger scheme regarding horses onto which Crosman had inadvertently stumbled.  
 Crosman’s inquiries into the storage of Dragoon horses in St. Louis yielded 
evidence of a six month long process of deliberately mistreating and reselling public 
horses at a dramatically raised rate, all of which benefited Brant.  While investigating 
Darnielle’s sales, Crosman asked where the horses were supposed to be stored.  The 
official returns stated they were stored on several properties surrounding the city.  
Darnielle, as well as popular rumor, suggested otherwise.  The horses were stored and 
cared for on Brant’s private property.258 Crosman interviewed Brant’s neighbors and 
former workers from the plantation, and quickly uncovered the disturbing treatment the 
horses underwent there.  The property was poorly suited to storing the sheer volume of 
animals on it, according to John Kimball, a field hand on Brant’s land.259 The initial 33 
horses stored there in May of 1837 quickly ate the majority of pasture grass, and by June 
the fields were nearly barren. A neighbor, George Bissell, commented to Crosman, “I 
                                               
256 Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A; Brant CTI, NARA, 
RG 153, CC 433½ , Box 105, 66.  
257 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 113.  
258Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A; Brant CTI, NARA, 
RG 153, CC 433½ , Box 105, 128, 158-174.  
259Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 174. 
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have often observed clouds of dust arising from the pasture...I have heard many a laugh, 
at the manner of faltering U.S. Horses.”260  Throughout the summer the number of 
horses varied on the plantation from less than 100 to as many as 200 with the most 
broken or starving animals quietly being auctioned off with the assistance of John 
Darnielle.261   To compensate for the lack of pasture, field hands purchased or brought in 
green corn to feed the animals.  They gave the newer stronger animals more feed and 
less to the wasting older ones.262  Green corn was dangerous to the animals’ health.  As 
witnesses later testified, the corn was not even the most economic method of keeping the 
horses fed.263  According to Kimball and Bissell, Brant and his staff were not frugal; 
rather, they were incompetent at best or negligent at worst in their care for the 
animals.264   
 If Brant was incompetent or negligent at caring for the public animals, he was 
certainly neither of those things when it came to profiting off them. Crosman, in his 
analysis of Brant’s returns, found that there were two main methods of generating 
income from the animals on his land.  The first method was fraudulent accounts made by 
                                               
260Brant attempted to discredit Bissell’s testimony at his court of inquiry claiming that 
Bissell had never stepped foot on Brant’s property, and that all misconduct was viewed 
from the adjacent land.  However, clouds of dust and their implication of over-grazed 
fields are hard to mistake, even at a distance. Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, 
Box 105, 79, 81-84, 148. 
261Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 166-174.  
262Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 181-187, 296-301.  
263 Green corn used as feed increases rates of choking, and can cause colic and founder 
in horses.  If Brant did not know this his workers charged with caring for the animals 
most certainly did; Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A; 
Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½ , Box 105, 83-84, 130, 181-187.  
264Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 142-153, 163-174.  
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workers who all staffed the plantation for one to two months from May to October 1837.  
John Kimball identified other men under his employ, who thought they were “employed 
in the public service” and testified to Brant telling them so.265 Someone named William 
Dowler, for example, had allegedly kept some of the horses on his property.  Upon 
investigation “no one knew of any man of that name who had kept horses hereabouts.”266  
Kimball, among others, admitted to signing blank receipts under Brant’s supervision.  
Another employee of Brant later commented that the receipts were “signed by Dowler 
blank; that is the items were not put in nor the amount in the receipt.”267 This allowed 
Brant to set the price of wages, feed, and services rendered by his “publicly-employed” 
staff, a power he abused to the tune of several thousand dollars.  Brant’s abuse of 
Richard Morgan, his slave “employed by the government” was a particularly despicable 
instance of fraud.  Brant’s returns “conveyed the idea that he [Morgan] was a free man, 
and that the wages paid to him on account of the U.S. were for his sole use and benefit; 
whereas said wages were for the use and benefit of Lt. Col. Brant himself.”268  Morgan 
was not manumitted for his efforts. Brant’s ability to manipulate the receipts from his 
plantation worked to drastically increase his profit beyond the wages of his employees 
and slaves.  
                                               
265 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 88.  
266  Norman Dowler eventually testified for his brother during the Court of Inquiry and 
vouched for his taking care of the animals.  It appears that William Dowler was under a 
similar agreement with Brant as Kimball and Darnielle; Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 
433½, Box 105, 23, 79. 
267 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 82. 
268 Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A; Brant CTI, NARA, 
RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 868.  
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Brant’s second method of profiting off of his horse fraud was overcharging the 
government for the purchase of feed and the animals themselves, often in “poor, 
miserable condition.”269  Brant’s mistreatment of the animals was the key to generating 
further scrutiny into his operation.  When Brant turned over the animals to Crosman in 
October 1837, as he was returning to Florida, their condition alarmed Crosman and gave 
him cause to put together an official board of officers to examine the animals.270  The 
board of examination convened in late fall of 1837 and condemned the majority of the 
wasted animals as unfit for Dragoon service in Florida.271    
Upon investigation of the animal’s condition, Crosman interviewed the 
plantation workers regarding feed. The discussions unveiled an entire other angle to 
Brant’s schemes. Brant, it seemed, was charging the government drastically more for the 
purchased feed, that was often old and decaying, and was only used when grass and 
green corn were not available.272  The plantation charged the federal government $3.00 
per horse per week.  Since the number of horses varied, Brant’s profits did as well.  For 
example, in July, Brant reported he stored 65 horses for Dragoon service, for $3.00 a day 
totaling $1,077.09. Crosman interviewed Captain Eaton regarding livery prices in the 
city for the same number of horses and found they could be stabled for as little as .50 
cents per day, with shelter and fresh feed.273  Like Darnielle’s purchases, and the wages 
                                               
269Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A; Brant CTI, NARA, 
RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 15.  
270Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 15. 
271Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 30-31.  
272 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 181.  
273To confirm this, Crosman interviewed livery owners in the city and verified both the 
prices of Hay, Grain, and shelter for horses.  All were dramatically lower that Brant’s 
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of his workers, Brant skimmed overhead into his private accounts from grossly 
overpriced feed totaling roughly $4,654 from the horse-related plantation schemes alone.  
Given that a Major’s annual salary was between $1,200-1,500 in 1837, Brant made a 
handsome profit of almost four times his yearly wages in less than six months from this 
scheme alone.274   Crosman’s investigations into Brant’s misconduct were not just 
limited to the countryside around St. Louis; his illegal designs took root along the river 
banks as well.  
While Brant was profiting off the horses wasting away on his plantation, he was 
collecting a 33% higher rent than the market value on storehouses he owned, hired by 
two separate sections of the War Department, the Quartermaster Department, and the 
Indian Department.275  The opportunities of profiteering off the dual missions of 
supplying the army in removal operations, and aiding the resettlement of removed 
Indigenous peoples must have been appealing to someone with the appetite for quick 
money like Brant.  As Crosman continued his investigations, he was alerted by a fellow 
                                               
reported prices; Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 152, 166-168, 187, 
249. 
274 According to the official charges brought against Brant, he made a total sum of 
$6,104.  This number was found by adding all dollar amounts labeled in these charges.  
They are as follows: George McGunnegle account $48, $24, William Dowler Account, 
$549, $975, Kimball Account, $702, $495, $13, J.O. Bradshaw Account, $1,077, Samuel 
Remmick (Brant’s slave Alias Richard Morgan) Wages not listed, Seminole Accounts, 
$417, $367. Brant also requested two payments for the amounts of $6,000 and $4,000 
under the name of J.P. Davis to George McGunnegle in November of 1838.  These were 
not paid by the federal government, they are not included in the total; Brant CTM, 
NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A; For officer salaries in this era see: 
Skelton, American Profession, 190-199.  
275 The highest competitor rent that Crosman found was $750 per annum, with the 
average rent falling closer to $500 annually; Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, 
Box 105, Appendix A; Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½ , Box 105, 17, 306-329. 
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officer, Captain Ethan Allen Hitchcock, acting as the Indian Department representative 
in St. Louis, that there were Indian Department goods stored in the warehouses at 
Second and Laurel.276 Crosman was aware of the store houses as a warehouse for 
Quartermaster Department supplies, and was already suspicious of its $1,000 annual 
rent.277  When Crosman tried to rent from cheaper competitor storehouses, he was 
ordered by his superior, Brant, to cease his actions.278  Crosman quietly made inquiries at 
the county courthouse and found that, not only did Brant own the storehouses, but the 
man allegedly the landlord, George K. McGunnegle, was not formally renting the 
property from the Major.279 Crosman later testified regarding the discoveries he made 
when combining ledgers with court records, “I believe it from the fact that...the official 
act [account], shows that a rent on the building was charged to the q.m. department and 
the cash book of the Indian Department in possession of Major Hitchcock exhibiting a 
charge for Indian goods stored in that building at the same time- both in the handwriting 
of Major Brant’s confidential clerk.”280 Brant, for at least the year of 1837, collected 
annual payments amounting to $2,000 in addition to the money he was making off of the 
fraudulent horse expenses. Crosman, with this damning evidence in hand, “asked if this 
was the fact, it was certainly wrong to charge a double rent on the same building...To 
                                               
276Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A. 
277 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 306-318. 
278Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 320-329. 
279 Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A; Brant CTI, NARA, 
RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 320-329. 
280Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 37-39. 
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this he [Brant] made no satisfactory reply, only remarking that warehouses were 
scarce.”281 
During the summer and fall of 1837, Brant engaged in other schemes, which 
were smaller in profit, but equally illegal.  While stationed in Tampa from June to 
November 1838, Brant took charge of disbursing payments for the federal purchase of 
horses in the city to aid the war effort. Like Quartermasters before him in the Southeast, 
Brant issued receipts so the civilians or surrendered Seminoles could file claims for 
payment.282  Brant arrived in time to oversee a major purchase of horses from a large 
body of Seminoles in Tampa awaiting removal to New Orleans. Brant purchased 80 
horses from Seminoles, and the receipts he wrote amounted to $784.  Brant paid the 
Seminoles a paltry $9.80 a head at a time when healthy horses were going for as much as 
$300 a head in Southeastern states like Georgia and South Carolina.283  If paying a 
fraction of the price for horses in Florida was not enough, Brant made duplicates of the 
receipts and brought them back to Missouri while he attended his Court of Inquiry.  
There, “knowing it to be false as a voucher” Brant disbursed funds for the duplicate 
receipts “signed” by Seminoles accepting the $784 dollars and depositing it in his own 
accounts, effectively denying the Indigenous sellers what little they were owed.284  
                                               
281Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 17.  
282Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A.  
283 JL to TJ, January 28, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.; Horses sent to Garry’s Ferry by 
Lt John L’Engle August 9 to  November 3 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 604.;  L’Engle 
shipping manifests/complaining of ships in early 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603.;  CC to 
TC October 24, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 603; CC to TC October 25 1836, NARA, RG 
92, Box 603; Requisitions of MM Clark & Col. Pierce from Savannah Fall 1836, 
NARA, RG 92, Box 603. 
284Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A. 
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While not nearly as heinous as denying payment to a group of people already 
unfairly persecuted by the government, Brant was involved in one more much smaller 
matter, this one involving two canoes.  The watercraft were purchased on Kimball’s 
account with the Quartermaster’s Department in June of 1837 for $6.50 a piece, and 
were allegedly purchased “for feeding dragoon horses.”285  Perhaps workers desired a 
quick passage to St. Louis from the waterfront of Brant’s property, or perhaps Brant and 
his family simply desired a bit of water-based recreation on hot summer days.  Whatever 
the case, it was clear to Crosman and the board of officers at Brant’s court martial that 
two canoes offered no utility when it came to feeding horses. While the duplicate 
receipts and the minor expenses of canoes pale in comparison to the larger horse and 
storehouse schemes, they demonstrate the sheer arrogance of Brant as he committed 
offenses against man and animal alike.  In culmination, Brant’s actions demonstrate a 
single Quartermaster’s abuse of the system and the corruption which could be generated 
by unchecked authority among army Quartermasters. The overwhelming amount of 
evidence Crosman uncovered in his six month investigation provided ample grounds to 
trigger a Court of Inquiry in October of 1838, which in turn provided significant 
evidence to bring about a formal court martial a year later in 1839.  
 
 
 
                                               
285 Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A; Brant CTI, NARA, 
RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 867. 
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THE BEST LAID PLANS: THE CASE OF JOSHUA B.  BRANT 
 On Monday December 3rd, 1838, after seven months of trial, Brant’s Court of 
Inquiry reconvened again in their court room. Brant called Crosman as a witness for 
examination.286 Brant’s questioning went on for several minutes before, in a particularly 
heated exchange he asked, “State whether you have on several occasions declared that 
you would establish charges against Col. Brant which ought to cause his dismissal from 
the service?”  Crosman’s reply echoed his personal disdain for the man, but remained 
within the bounds of court proceedings.  He responded, “I have repeatedly declared that 
I thought I should be able to establish the accusations now undergoing accusation; and 
perhaps others of equal importance.  I think if proved he [Brant] ought to be compelled 
to leave the army.”287  During 1838 and 1839, these two men engaged in a bitter 
courtroom battle.  Crosman utilized his large amounts of damning evidence to bring as 
many charges as legally possible against his rival, and Brant tried his hardest to cast his 
opponent as a conniving, spiteful man, jealous of Brant’s rank and station. The truth of 
the matter, however, is revealed in the sheer number of witnesses and consistency of 
testimony given during the Court of Inquiry and Court Martial. Try as Brant might to 
discredit Crosman, Kimball, and Bissell, more and more witnesses came forth to back 
Crosman’s allegations.  The sheer number of testimonies, (totaling over 2,000 pages 
between the cases) and the evidence presented to the court (over 65 individual articles) 
                                               
286 Military Courts of Inquiry in this era allowed the officers under investigation to call 
witnesses and question them personally.  Courts Martial functioned more as a traditional 
criminal court case with defense and prosecution.  
287Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 64-66. 
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and the numerous appendixes weighed heavily against Brant’s flimsy defense.288  In 
1839, the court found him guilty on all counts and sentenced Brant to be cashiered from 
the army. The wayward officer resigned in response, avoiding the sentence entirely.289   
The years of court deliberations and defense provide much insight into how the truth of 
Brant’s numerous schemes came to light.  
 The Court of Inquiry began in October 1838, nearly a year after Crosman’s initial 
inquiries into Brant’s conduct and the more candid, less formal nature of the testimonies 
provide the best window into how exactly the case was seen and discussed by officers 
and witnesses alike.  Throughout the proceedings the accuser, accused, and court were 
allowed to examine and cross examine witnesses at will.  Thus, the testimony of the case 
resembles more of a frank discussion of Brant’s actions—with Brant’s own opinions 
thrown in—than a formal court case.  Witnesses like Kimball and Bissell were often 
placed on the defensive, answering both for their actions in regards to Brant’s schemes, 
but also for their personal character.290  Kimball was caught in such a predicament when 
discussing his agreement to purchase grain for Brant. The court asked him “did you not 
state w/ Capt. Crosman that an agreement of this kind was made by you with Major 
Brant?”  Kimball replied, hastily “I don’t think I did make such a statement to Capt. 
Crosman; if I did, I don’t know what I was thinking about, for no such agreement was 
                                               
288Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105; Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 
433½, Box 105.   
289 There is no evidence that Brant was compelled legally to repay the Federal 
Government, nor the Seminole Nation. Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 
105, 385.  
290 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 53, 69-70, 79-81, 84-88, 94-106, 
148-152.  
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ever made between Major Brant and me.”291  While the mistake did not fundamentally 
discredit Kimball’s testimony, Brant no doubt relished the contradictions.  However, for 
each small win in Brant’s defense, Crosman was able to call more witnesses from the 
city to shore up his accusations.  Namely these witnesses were livery, storehouse, and 
grain market owners who verified not only the market value of their commodities, but 
the odd nature of Brant’s activities as a Quartermaster in the city.292   Much of the 
testimony and information they provided the court was directly carried over into the 
Court Martial the following year.  However, the animosity between Brant and Crosman 
often threatened to derail the trial entirely, no doubt a strategy Brant willfully employed 
to his advantage.  
 Crosman and Brant’s rivalry was a major feature of the Court of Inquiry and 
acted as Brant’s primary means of defense in both cases brought against him. Brant 
wrote in his initial statement to the court in October of 1838:  “For the last three years I 
have been the object of unceasing and embarrassing attacks which were made with the 
intention of destroying my reputation and character as an officer and a man of honor, by 
charging me with having conducted a long series of petty speculations for which even 
abject poverty, could not furnish an excuse and which even the lowest and most 
degraded of our community would hesitate about perpetuating.”293 Clearly a slight aimed 
at Crosman, Brant did not hesitate in framing his rival in the most negative light 
                                               
291 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 172.  
292 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 23-24, 32, 99-113, 130, 141-148, 
152, 162, 181, 329-349.  
293Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 5. 
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possible.  During questioning, Brant even brought up the possibility of a conspiracy 
designed by Crosman to assume his position.  Brant asserted, “State whether you were 
not serious of being permanently stationed at St. Louis in the q masters department, and 
whether you did or did not vision Major Brant an impediment to so being?”  Crosman 
responded coolly, “I never had such a thought, that Major Brant was the impediment to 
my being stationed here; well knowing that there were other officers of rank between us, 
whose right it would be to occupy this station before me.”294 That Brant’s major defense 
was to discredit Crosman worked against him at nearly every turn, the evidence 
Crosman brought to bear was simply too overwhelming, personal animosity or not.  As a 
result the Court’s opinion in September 1838 called for a formal Court Martial against 
Brant.295   
 Brant’s Court Martial, despite being a near identical rehash of the Court of 
Inquiry drew significant attention from the Army's senior staff as well as local media.296  
The massive amount of evidence revealed by the Court of Inquiry justified a court of 
officers matched only by the much more highly publicized investigation into Scott and 
Gaines’s misconduct in Florida in 1836.  Yet, for the immense professional scrutiny of 
                                               
294 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 57.  
295 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433½, Box 105, 871-877.  
296 An Op-Ed railing against Brant’s corruption appeared in the Missouri Republican 
authored by an anonymous author calling himself  “Vindicator” in June of 1837 as the 
Court of Inquiry commenced.  Brant CTM, NARA, RG153, Articles 37, 48.; The Court 
was comprised of officers as follows: Bvt. Brig. Gen. John Wool, Bvt. Bring Genl. 
Walker Armistead, Bvt. Col. John Walbach, Col. George Crogham, Bvt. Col. William 
Foster, Col. Thomas Cross, Maj. Henry Graig, Maj. Michael Payne, Maj. Bache, Bvt. 
Maj. Levi Whiting, Maj. John Taylor, Capt. D.H. Vinton, Capt. William Hart; Brant 
CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A , Box 105, 1-2, Articles 47-49.  
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the case, the Court Martial played out similarly to the Court of Inquiry.  The charges 
brought against Brant fell in three categories, fraud against the government, neglect of 
duty, and conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. The fraud charges were 
divided into 14 specifications, each outlining, almost verbatim, the initial letter Crosman 
sent to Secretary of War Robert Jones spurring the initial Court of Inquiry.  The only 
additions were the profiteering charges against the Seminoles and the canoe matter 
uncovered during the first case.297 Crosman again presented the fruits of his 
investigation, witnesses were brought before the court and hundreds of pages of 
testimony were spent determining the price of corn in 1837, and whether or not Brant’s 
actions constituted malpractice.298  The primary difference was the absence of Brant’s 
defamation defense.   Brant watched the case spiral further out of his favor. In October 
of 1839, nearly a year after the trial began the court rendered its decision--guilty on all 
counts.  Crosman’s diligent inquiries, it seemed, paid off.   
Because he was guilty of the largest fraud against the American government 
during the Second Seminole War, the court dealt Brant a unique punishment given the 
severity of offense.  The court ordered in addition to being cashiered from the army, “the 
crime, name and place of abode of the delinquent be published in the newspapers in and 
about the camp and particular state from which the offender came or where he usually 
resides.”299  A punishment targeted at an officer’s reputation and personal honor was a 
                                               
297 Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, Appendix A.  
298 There were 45 Individual witnesses called in total for Brant’s case, many being called 
several times to the stand;  Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A , Box 105, Index.  
299 Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A, Box 105, 383. 
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devastating blow.  Historian Lorien Foote has defined honor among nineteenth-century 
officers as “when a man’s self-worth is based on public reputation and the respect of 
others.”300 Attacks on one’s manly honor often resulted in duels, canings, or fights, thus 
the systematic dismantling of a Lt. Col’s reputation would not be a small punishment by 
any measure.  It is unclear if this punishment by defamation was in response to Brant’s 
attempts at destroying the character of Crosman, or simply ruled an appropriate response 
to the sheer size of Brant’s offenses.  Brant, after his resignation, sold the storehouses on 
Second and Laurel as well as the majority of his property outside the city.301  Brant 
remained in the St. Louis area for the remainder of his life, yet could not stay out of the 
courts.  In 1860, Brant was before the Missouri Supreme Court over a land dispute, but 
he died in 1861, before the conclusion of the case.302  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The case of Joshua Brant presents a comprehensive list of ways an army 
Quartermaster could abuse his rank, position, and responsibilities to his benefit during 
Jacksonian Indian Removal.  Between May 1837-January 1838, Brant illegally acquired 
$6,104.303   The wayward Quartermaster did so, not by some grand heist, but rather a 
                                               
300 Lorien Foote, Gentleman and the Roughs: Violence, Honor, and Manhood in the 
Union Army (New York: New York University Press, 2010) 5-6. 
301 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433 ½, Box 105, 133. Brant sold his land for 
$250,000. 
302Brant and Grantham were in dispute over the appointment of a trustee to land owned 
by the aging Brant.  Joshua B. Brant v. Taliafero P. Grantham, St. Charles County 
Historical Society 1860, Group C, Box 16, Folder 168. 
303 According to the official charges brought against Brant, he made a total sum of 
$6,104.  This number was found by adding all dollar amounts labed in these charges.  
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series of “petty” schemes of “trivial” expense to the Quartermaster Department.304   
These numerous schemes provide detailed blueprints for analyzing both military and 
civilian purchases in that era that may have been “in disregard to the interests of the 
United States.”305  Elements of Brant’s plots, especially the duplicate receipts and fake 
expense returns, were scattered amidst the wanton spending that occurred both in and 
outside of the theater of the Second Seminole War.  However, few known fraudulent 
claims made against the government had the sheer scale and cost that Brant’s did.  His 
many plots offer a cautionary tale regarding the abuse of power and rank that could 
occur in modern contexts as easily as they fit in the 1830s.  Profiteering, fraud, and 
corruption are hardly isolated occurrences throughout history, despite their lack of 
academic coverage within the antebellum era.  
 Brant’s horse and storehouse schemes demonstrate the ease with which officers 
of the immensely overstretched and overtaxed American Army could eschew 
professionalism in favor of personal gain.  Brant was not the only Major, or high-ranking 
officer, holding a Quartermaster General position in a city stationed far from 
Washington City.306  He was, however, the only officer of rank to get caught committing 
                                               
They are as follows: George McGunnegle account $48, $24, William Dowler Account, 
$549, $975, Kimball Account, $702, $495, $13, J.O. Bradshaw Account, $1,077, 
Richard Morgan (Brant’s slave) Wages not listed, Seminole Accounts, $417, $367. Brant 
also requested two payments for the amounts of $6,000 and $4,000 under the name of 
J.P. Davis to George McGunnegle in November of 1838.  These were not paid, they are 
not included in the total; Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A , Box 105, Appendix 
A; Skelton, American Profession,190-199.  
304 Brant CTI, NARA, RG 153, CC 433 ½ , Box 105, 5. 
305 Brant CTM, NARA, RG 153, CC 437A , Box 105, Appendix A 
306 Isaac Clark Held a similar position in his home city of New Orleans, however, unlike 
Brant, Clark held nothing but disdain for the responsibilities of the job. IC to TJ 
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such a fraud on such a large scale.  Many of the other Quartermasters were both far 
younger and more junior to superiors stationed in cities in the Southeast.  Because of the 
excess autonomy granted to Quartermasters supplying the war effort in Florida, there 
was little chance for repercussion.  Indeed, it seems his rival George Crosman was the 
only man willing to press such ludicrous sounding charges against the long time 
Quartermaster of the city.  Brant, after all, had both a staff and fellow ranking officers in 
the city able to access his ledgers, yet few questioned him until after Crosman began his 
investigations. This begs the question: how many similar schemes may have taken place 
without the benefit of a determined investigator hunting down clues?   The numerous 
claims rejected by the Treasury Department hints at an answer.  
 The Third Auditor of the United States Treasury department was responsible for 
reviewing every claim made against the government by civilians during the Second 
Seminole War, and from 1837-1851 he was quite busy.  The majority of claims, of 
which there were thousands ranging from minor expenses to the purchases of 
steamboats, the office accepted with little comment. The majority of civilian claims filed 
against the government were relatively small expenses, a horse here, a dozen bales of 
hay there, most of which were purchased personally or by order of a regular 
Quartermaster in the nearby region.  These claims often carried this Quartermaster’s 
                                               
February 7, 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607.  IC to TJ April 11, 1836, NARA, RG 92, 
Box 607; FN to TJ April 25. 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 607;  All officers assigned 
Quartermaster positions were promoted at least once during the course of the Second 
Seminole War. However, only a handful rose above the rank of Captain.  Fewer still 
operated in isolation like Brant.  
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signature of endorsement.307  It was in the gray area of militia Quartermasters that 
expense tended to inflate under murky auspicious.   
The Third Auditor Peter Hagner contacted Quartermasters of the various 
Southeastern militia units several times to answer for their egregious expenses during the 
1836-1837 campaigns.308 The majority of these expenses were for overpriced horses, 
hotels, and food.  In particular, purchases of tailored suits and alcohol tended to flag 
returns as fraudulent.309  Similarly, Hagner investigated cases where Volunteer 
Quartermasters bought goods from relatives at steep rates.310  These expenses were 
brought into question and when found fraudulent the state was required to pay back 
expenses due to the difficulty of soliciting individuals. Compounding problems with 
collecting was the defense of such claims by Governors like Richard Keith Call, who 
defended the actions of volunteer Quartermasters.311    Again the urgency of campaigns 
and incompetence of commanders in the field to anticipate the needs of their troops was 
the primary driver of militia expenses during the war.  However, the methods of abuse 
by volunteer Quartermasters, whether intentional or otherwise, suggest that the Second 
                                               
307 A review of claims filed against the Quartermaster Department showed that many 
purchases from individual civilians seemed to be in good order.  Price gouging was not 
an illegal activity; thus, the Third Auditor generally approved most transactions even if 
the pricing was exorbitant.  Florida Claims, 1836-1840, NARA, RG92, Box 602; Florida 
Militia Claims 1841, NARA, RG 92, Box 603; Florida Militia Special Claims 1841-
1844, NARA, RG 92, Box 604; Florida War Claims, NARA, RG 92, Box 606. 
308 Florida War Claims, NARA, Box 606.  
309Report of the Third Auditor upon Sundry Claims for Forage purchased by Territorial 
Qr. Master John Saw for the use of Militia whose services were assumed by the United 
States, August 22, 1842, NARA, RG 92, Box 607 
310 Florida War Claims, NARA, RG 92, Box 606.  
311 RKC to Lewis Cass, May 1836, NARA, RG 92, Box 602. 
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Seminole War provided both opportunity, urgency, and credit to facilitate the ballooning 
of expense Hagner spent over a decade sifting through.   
 Brant’s schemes were easily the largest documented attempt at exploiting the 
loose restrictions on Army spending during the Second Seminole War, but his methods 
could easily be recreated. The combination of authority, location, and unsupervised 
spending is a combination easily found through both American and foreign conflict 
throughout history.  Scholarly literature has remained decidedly quiet on the 
consequences of corruption in the supply of armies, particularly in the context of the 
nineteenth century.312 This chapter has provided an example of exactly how fruitful 
further analysis into the investigation and prosecution of such cases can be to bettering 
the understanding of the functions of the American Army and its Quartermaster 
Department.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
312 Hess’s Civil War Logistics, easily the most detailed scholarly history written on 
logistics in the 19th century, explicitly avoids discussing Supply of the Union Army.  He 
chooses instead to focus his highly detailed efforts on Transportation. xi-xvx. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Logistics during the Second Seminole War was characterized by several factors:  
incompetence, wastefulness, and abuse, but also adaptability and independence. While 
the initial campaigns of the Second Seminole War were commanded by leaders who 
routinely overestimated the capabilities of their soldiers, the animals that carried them, 
and their supply lines, those lines eventually formed into reliable methods of delivering 
goods to a war fought in some of the harshest and most remote landscapes eastern North 
America had to offer.  In order to campaign in such environments, the cost of the 
conflict quickly inflated as commanders like Richard Keith Call put faith in an 
extravagantly expensive cavalry campaign despite its disadvantages. The credit lines 
required to supply armies in such terrain created the conditions for rampant abuse among 
Quartermasters in cities tasked with supplying the army.  When the opportunity 
presented itself in St. Louis, these factors created a massive instance of fraud perpetrated 
by a single officer in less than a year.  The failures of the early campaigns of the war and 
the numerous fraud schemes perpetuated by Joshua Brant serve to illustrate the scope of 
oversights committed by commanding officers and the federal government during the 
first years of the Florida War.  Despite the massive problems with acquisitions and 
supply, the isolated, overworked Quartermasters in Florida and other Southeastern states 
still managed to meet and often exceed the expectations placed on them by the theater 
commanders during the Second Seminole War.  
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The early campaigns of the Second Seminole War from 1836-1837 demonstrated 
the immense importance of understanding the terrain before pursuing enemies through it.  
While Clinch, Gaines, Call, and to a lesser extent Scott, attempted to achieve a fast, 
flexible, offensive against Osceola’s band, none actually did so.  The key factors 
stopping each successive attempt was first and foremost skillful exploitation of the 
terrain by Indigenous warriors.  Wherever the opposing forces met in this early stage of 
the war, there was a hammock, swamp, or river between them.  These features allowed 
the Seminoles to maintain initiative in choosing the ground and timing of nearly every 
major battle fought from 1835 to 1837.  
The second major factor behind the succession of failed campaigns was the 
overestimation of the efficiency of early supply lines into the territory. While the 
beleaguered Quartermasters eventually were able to meet the constant, and varying, 
demands of the commanders, it was not without months of poor wagon-horse conditions, 
too few wagons, and incredibly high market prices.  The result was the initial belief 
among commanders like Gaines and Call that they could move beyond their supplies and 
that it would catch up to their forces with enough forage and rations to sustain the 
overextended armies.  This was a reality that never materialized during the Second 
Seminole War.   
The final factor was misapplication and overreliance on horse power during the 
early campaigns.  As Col. Henry Stanton laboriously pointed out in 1841, horses were 
extravagantly wasteful to the campaigns in Florida. There were no grazing pastures for 
them, there were seldom open fields to maneuver with them, and when Seminoles 
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presented themselves to fight it was usually behind a swamp that forced horse-bourne 
units to dismount before attacking.  Horses died by the hundreds of starvation, sickness, 
rotted hooves, and environmental hazards.  Yet, commanders like Richard Keith Call 
refused to adopt new strategies, believing that a lightning cavalry strike extended beyond 
his supply lines could bring swift victory over an opponent that had better command of 
the land than he.      
Historians have overlooked the actions of officers tasked with supplying the 
many horse-borne misadventures of the army.  As news of the destruction of Dade’s 
detachment reached major media outlets, the junior officers stationed in Southeastern 
cities acted of their own volition setting up the initial framework of the transportation 
infrastructure that sustained armies in the war.  From purchasing entire stocks of horses 
to chartering egregiously priced steam boats, these Quartermasters were on the forefront 
of the supply lines allowing the campaigns of Scott, Gaines, and Call, to materialize in a 
coherent fashion.  Equally as important as supplying the regular army, Quartermasters 
also supplied the Volunteer units who eagerly mustered in larger numbers than expected 
to travel south and fight.   These units, in particular the mounted ones, generated both 
animosity and expenses once in theater due to the drastically high rates of mortality 
among their federally provided animals.  These costs help address much of the mystery 
behind the explosion of expenses during the war.    
As Mahon argued in 1985, no academic has taken on the challenge of explaining 
the 30-40 million dollar price tag of the war.313  While this study does not purport to 
                                               
313 Mahon, Second Seminole War, 326. 
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answer that question fully, the analysis of the credit increases during the first years of the 
war, particularly during the Call campaign, suggests two focal points for analyzing 
spending during the conflict.  The first is the mentality of theater commanders, who 
misunderstood costs and overestimated transport efficiency and ease of supply 
acquisition.  Scott’s hoarding of supplies in Jacksonville and Picolata as well as Call’s 
inability to issue requests in a timely fashion both reflect different but equally flawed 
ways theater commanders understood the logistical problems of campaigning in Florida.  
 The second angle of approach is studying the documents of the Quartermasters 
themselves, including those stationed some distance from the conflict.  The letters of 
Michael Clark, Charles Collins, and John L’Engle all provide a vivid window into the 
intersection of civilian and military economies, and the prices attached to critical items 
for the war effort.  Horses, forage, rations, and reliable transportation, all provided a 
weekly, if not daily, struggle for these Quartermasters and furnishes new insight into the 
state of the local and the national economy on the eve of the Panic of 1837.  The ways in 
which Southeastern Quartermasters interacted with banks, merchants, and their 
department office in Washington City help to illustrate the escalation of credit over cash 
in these interactions and how the orders of one theater commander, Call, shaped the 
spending habits of the entire army.  While Quartermasters under Call’s command spared 
no expense and the supply lines solidified, civilian and military opportunists eagerly 
took advantage of the situation.  
The case of Joshua Brant was the culmination of the exploitation of massive 
federal spending in the Southeast.  With permissions for spending increasing and 
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thresholds of credit rising well above normal rates without seeming to raise suspicion, 
Brant utilized rank, distance from formal supervision, and local connections to formulate 
an infrastructure of corruption in St. Louis from 1836-1838. The charges brought against 
him group around three types of fraud schemes: horse-related, storehouse rent, and 
smaller schemes with worker wages.  Taken together, Brant’s case demonstrates how a 
series of small earning schemes net a far larger profit over time.  Brant’s schemes 
occurred in a timeframe where the economy was shaky, officers were not paid well, and 
rank came with significant privileges given the scarcity of officers. It was, in many 
ways, a perfect set of opportunities.  Without the chance appointment of Brant’s rival, 
Crosman, to the city, his schemes may have gone undetected.   
From a historical perspective Brant’s schemes serve as a blueprint to analyze 
potentially understudied and undetected corruption within the era of Indian removal as 
well as in other major conflicts.   Brant’s utilization of false and blank receipts, double 
booked storage spaces, and gross overcharging for wasted horses, are all activities the 
Treasury Department looked into during its investigation into civilian claims levied 
against the government in the name of supplying the Second Seminole War, a relatively 
insignificant conflict.314  If such analysis can be applied to larger conflicts such as the 
                                               
314 While the Second Seminole War was economically and militarily insignificant 
compared to future conflicts the regular Army would face, it is still important to 
acknowledge the severity of the conflict from the Seminole perspective.  The Seminoles 
were fighting for their survival against invaders bent on removing them from their land, 
stealing their cattle, and re-enslaving their maroon allies and slaves.  Throughout the 
whole conflict the Seminole population of Florida was reduce from 5,000 to 300 in 
seven years, the impact of the fighting on their society and culture can hardly be 
calculated in figures like expenses and causalities. 
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War of 1812, US-Mexican War, or the American Civil War, new and perhaps significant 
information about the acquisition and abuse of supply in the Quartermaster Department 
may be uncovered.   
 The Quartermaster Department's efforts during the Second Seminole War, as 
this study has shown, was often fatally taken for granted as campaign after campaign 
lived and died on the efficiency or overestimation of supply lines. The Department’s 
efforts reflect an immense amount of trust placed in a small body of junior officers, and 
surprisingly, that trust was betrayed by one of the more senior rather than junior officers 
in the Department. This study has shown the rich depth to logistical sources that reveal 
not only compelling evidence of major inefficiencies within the American Army, but 
also provide richness to the characters of the Quartermasters themselves.  An analysis of 
logistics, with attention paid to the Quartermaster’s efforts in facilitating, and sometimes 
exploiting, supply and transportation of items necessary for campaigns, offers historians 
a new and clearer vision of operational events. This vision can and should be applied to 
larger conflicts that historians have mistakenly thought thoroughly canvassed by military 
historians and scholars of the nineteenth-century.  
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